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Assessing the Market for Human
Reproductive Tissue Alienability:
Why Can We Sell Our Eggs But Not
Our Livers?
Brenda Reddix-Smalls*

ABSTRACT

Currently, an unregulated marketplace for assisted reproductive
technology exists in the United States. For some people suffering from
infertility, the ability to purchase human reproductive tissue, eggs, and
sperm yields a maximum benefit when examined in a market context.
Buyers, sellers, supply and demand, and technological advances all
operate in a robust marketplace to provide the infertile with a supply of
human eggs for reproduction with minimum state and federal
regulatory control. Conversely, the buying and selling of all other
human organs and tissues is prohibited in the United States by several
federal statutes. The National Organ TransplantAct (NOTA) and the
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) provide for complete statutory
prohibitions against obtaining valuable consideration in exchange for
human organs.
This article examines the lack of regulatory controls in the
assisted reproductive field by identifying the technologies available to
the infertile, reviewing the market forces that operate to preclude
federal regulatory control and assessing the governmental and societal
restrictions that prevented regulation in the human assisted
reproductive technology field. The introduction reviews the scientific
and technological advances of the twentieth century that led to the
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creation of a robust reproductive marketplace and the expectations of
citizens for life improvements based on science.
The article first explores the historicaland technological context
of legislation that currently operates to regulate scientific technologies
but excludes reproductive technology. Second, the article explores the
minimal legislation enacted to regulate reproductive technology, the
Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992, and the
three federal agencies under the Department of Health and Human
Services (the Center for Disease Control and Prevention, the Food and
Drug and Administration, and the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare
Services), which provide insignificant oversight. The article proceeds
to examine the market forces that operate to preclude federal regulatory
control: the lobbying arms and representative agents of the fertility
clinics, the pharmaceuticals, and the physicians providing
reproductive services. This examination of the market forces affecting
the reproductive field includes an analysis of the market dynamics of
supply and demand and shifts toward increased demand based on
technological advances and the resulting impact on consumers. The
article concludes with the opinion that the transfer of human
reproductive tissue has not received comparable regulatory control to
other human tissue transfer because of the economic interests of the
dominant force market players, the governmental failure to address the
ethical issues of a rapidly emergent technology, and the capture of
administrativeagencies by the dominant market forces.
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Through a lack of regulatory legislation, America is accepting a
laissez-faire climate or free-market' approach towards collaborative
reproduction involving the tissue transfer of human eggs for
procreation. 2 With practically every aspect of human-to-human tissue
transfer in the United States regulated, 3 the lack of regulatory control

1.
Cheryl Erwin, Utopian Dreams and Harsh Realities: Who Is In Control of
Assisted Reproductive Technologies in a High-Tech World, 9 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 621,

626 (2006). Erwin contends that our current laws regulating assisted reproductive
technology (ART) developed from a collection of federal laws that are best described as
market-driven. Id. She argues that the United States' "market-based regulation has not

left the industry without any regulation," but that the scant regulation may be considered
appropriate in a market focused more on "the patient's ability to choose or refuse ART
treatment as the most appropriate form of regulation in a pluralistic democracy." Id. Erwin
argues for greater dissemination of knowledge about the new ART technologies. Id.
See Helen M. Alvar6, The Case for Regulating Collaborative Reproduction: A
2.
Children's Rights Perspective, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 1 (2003) ("There is little regulation
of collaborative reproduction-the use of the eggs, sperm, or embryos of a third party to
create a child biologically unrelated to at least one intending parent."). Alvar6 contends
that collaborative reproduction implicates the rights of children and should be adjusted
from the perspective of children's rights. Id.
3.
See DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: HOW MONEY, SCIENCE, AND
POLITICS DRIVE THE COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION (2006) (reviewing the technology and

bioethical implications of reproductive services from a market analysis perspective). Spar's
thesis is that each area involved in "the making of babies" (e.g., infertility counseling, in
vitro fertilization, gestational surrogacy, and adoption) has spawned a growing market for
eggs, sperm, and, potentially, embryos. While adoption is regulated and baby selling is
almost universally prohibited, the other markets are largely unregulated. Id.; see also
National Organ Transplant Act of 1984, 42 U.S.C. §§ 273-274e (2000) (providing a
framework for the distribution of organs and tissues for transplant purposes and
establishing an Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, which is required to
provide criteria for allocating organs, "maintain a twenty-four-hour telephone service to
facilitate matching organs with individuals included in the list," "assist organ procurement
organizations in the nationwide distribution of organs equitably among transplant
patients," adopt quality standards for the acquisition and transportation of donated organs
(including standards for preventing infected organs), and "provide information to
physicians and other health professionals regarding organ donation"); 42 U.S.C. §§ 274k274m (2000) (establishing the C.W. Bill Young Cell Transplantation Program, successor to
the National Bone Marrow Donor Registry, for "the purpose of increasing the number of
transplants for recipients suitably matched to biologically unrelated donors of bone
marrow"); Kenneth Baum, Golden Eggs: Towards the Rational Regulation of Oocyte
Donation, 2001 BYU L. REV. 107, 123-24 (2001) (asserting that, despite its prolonged
existence and popularity, human egg donation as a form of noncoital or assisted
reproduction exists within a paucity of legislation, and noting that the "[iegislation that
does exist is variable and ambiguous" and includes only "three categories: 1) gamete donor
medical screening guidelines, 2) clinic reporting requirements, and 3) insurance coverage
guidelines"); id. at 128 ("Beyond the few state and federal [in vitro fertilization] statutes
and the highly variable and ambiguous state statutes that regulate the sale of human body
parts, there is no legislation in the United States that regulates the practice of oocyte
donation."); David L. Weimer, Public and Private Regulation of Organ Transplantation:
Liver Allocation and the Final Rule, 32 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 9 (2007) (examining the
availability of transplant organs, including kidneys, livers, hearts, lungs, pancreases, and
intestines, and the process by which they are allocated, and citing the Organ Procurement
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over human egg donation in particular, and assisted reproductive
technology (ART) in general, speaks volumes about the acceptance of a
4
free market approach to ART.
An unregulated marketplace for ART operates outside of the
United States' safeguards usually applied to new technology. Why is
almost all human tissue transfer federally regulated except for the
transfer of human eggs (or sperm)? 5 Although people can buy or sell
human eggs or sperm, human organ alienability for profit is strictly
6
prohibited and heavily regulated by federal and state laws.
Any examination of the current level of regulatory controls in
ART should include: (1) identifying the predominant ART technologies
available; (2) examining the market forces that operate to preclude
federal regulatory control; and (3) reviewing the pertinent
administrative legal regime that permits such scant regulatory
controls.
I conclude that the transfer of donor eggs does not receive
comparable regulatory control because of the convergence of (1) the
economic interests of the dominant force market players (consumers
and suppliers), (2) the governmental failure to address the ethical
issues of a rapidly emergent technology, and (3) the capture of
administrative agencies by the dominant market forces.

and Transplantation Network and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services as
the primary rule-making bodies regarding the allocation of transplant organs).
4.
See Alvar6, supra note 2, at 5-6 ("Collaborative reproduction . . . includes the
various processes by which 'intending parent(s)' use the embryos or gametes (sperm or
eggs), of one or more donors to conceive a child that the intending parents will legally rear.
A child born through collaborative reproduction is not the biological offspring of both
intending parents, though he may be the biological child of one intending parent." (footnote
omitted)).
5.
This paper is prompted by the question: why can you purchase human eggs but
not a human liver?
6.
See 42 U.S.C. § 274e (generally prohibiting the buying and selling of human
organs, and defining "human organs" to include "the human (including fetal) kidney, liver,
heart, lung, pancreas, bone marrow, cornea, eye, bone, and skin or any subpart thereof and
any other human organ (or any subpart thereof)," and stating that "[it shall be unlawful
for any person to knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ for
valuable consideration for use in human transplantation"); see also Charles C. Dunham IV,
"Body Property". Challenging the Ethical Barriers in Organ TransplantationTo Protect
Individual Autonomy, 17 ANNALS HEALTH L. 39, 41 n.12 (2008) ("Currently, federal and
state statutes specifically forbid the sale of human organs." (citing 42 U.S.C. § 274e; CAL.
PENAL CODE § 367f (West 1999); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-408 (LexisNexis 2005);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.10204 (West 2001); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW

(McKinney Supp. 2007))).

§
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I. INTRODUCTION
The advances in scientific research and technology in the
twentieth century created progressively higher expectations for the
alleviation of disease and sickness in the American human
population.7 Increasingly, in the United States, publicized advances
in scientific discoveries have led to heightened perceptions by the
public that life could be extended, epidemics could be eliminated, and
perhaps death could be cheated, for a time.8 All of the old fears for
7.
See THOMAS HAGER, THE DEMON UNDER THE MICROSCOPE: FROM BATTLEFIELD
HOSPITALS TO NAZI LABS, ONE DOCTOR'S HEROIC SEARCH FOR THE WORLD'S FIRST
MIRACLE DRUG 3-4 (2006) (recounting how antibiotics and new drugs were developed from
"sulfa," which changed the way Americans viewed diseases.). As Hager notes:
People in my parents' generation, as children, could and all too often did die from
strep throats, infected cuts, scarlet fever, meningitis, pneumonia, or any number
of infectious diseases. I and my classmates survived because of antibiotics. My
parents as children, and their parents before them, lost friends and relatives,
often at very early ages, to bacterial epidemics that swept through American
cities every fall and winter, killing tens of thousands. The suddenness and
inevitability of these epidemic deaths, facts of life before the 1930s, were for me
historical curiosities, artifacts of another age. Antibiotics virtually eliminated
them.
Id. at 3.
8.
See ALAN LIGHTMAN, THE DISCOVERIES: GREAT BREAKTHROUGHS IN 20TH
CENTURY SCIENCE 371 (2005) (commenting on the process through which James Watson,
Francis Crick, Maurice Wilkins, and Rosalind Franklin deciphered the genetic code of
DNA). Lightman argues:
The full impact of the discovery of the structure of DNA has not yet been
measured.... The first "gene therapy," a process of curing disease by modifying
a person's DNA, occurred in 1990 for severe combined immune deficiency (SCID).
...It is impossible to say what lies in the future. The knowledge of DNA and
how to modify it could help cure disease, alter personality and behavior, create
new life forms, produce new kinds of computers, produce creatures half animal
and half machine.
Id.; see Researchers Isolate Human Stem Cells in the Lab: Breakthrough Could Lead to
Treatments for Paralysis, Diabetes, CNN.COM, Nov. 5, 1998, http://www.cnn.com/
HEALTH/9811/05/stem.cell.discovery/ (reporting that researchers "have successfully grown
human stem cells in a laboratory, a major advance that could one day help in organ
transplantation, gene therapy and treatment of such maladies as paralysis, diabetes and
AIDS"). See generally CHRISTOPHER THOMAS SCOTT, STEM CELL Now: FROM THE
EXPERIMENTATION THAT SHOOK THE WORLD TO THE NEW POLITICS OF LIFE 3-4 (2006)
(reporting on the public attention that occurred after the scientist James Thomson
published the first paper where he reported that he had developed the first line of human
embryonic stem cells). Scott argues:
The scientific and medical implications contained in this short paper are
profound and unambiguous. Embryonic stem cells could be used to generate new
tissue and organs for transplantations. Defective and dying tissues caused by
diseases such as Parkinson's or diabetes could be replaced with an unlimited
supply of specially grown stem cells.
Id. But see JAMES D. WATSON & ANDREW BERRY, DNA: THE SECRET OF LIFE ix (2003)
("DNA has moved from being an esoteric molecule only of interest to a handful of
specialists to being the heart of a technology that is transforming many aspects of the way
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conditions such as heart failure, lung impairments, eyesight loss,
epidemic catastrophes, and pandemic scourges were met with
Human
scientific theory, research, and, ultimately, curatives.
infirmities, as varied as growth imperfections and even infertility,
were attacked and conquered by the new science. Genetic deficiencies
that subjected humans to the luck of the draw were predicted to fall
before the juggernaut of science and technology. 9
These rapid advances in technology created new markets to
meet the demand for human tissue and body parts needed to
The intellectual property
implement the scientific discoveries.' 0
expanded and offered
States
United
in
the
regime
protection
protection for technological innovation in areas ranging from
pharmaceutical compositions to DNA patents. 1 Between the 1950s
we all live. With that transformation has come a host of difficult questions about its
impact-practical, social, and ethical.").
See Erwin, supra note 1, at 621 ("The twentieth century witnessed an explosion
9.
of scientific knowledge and technological achievement. The discovery of insulin in 1922 led
to treatments for diabetes. The unique properties of penicillin, discovered in 1928, were
called a medical miracle and a 'magic bullet' when the drug was used on infected wounds..
• . Other scientific and medical discoveries followed: kidney dialysis, tetracycline, oral
contraceptives, and pharmaceutical products that help millions of Americans every day.").
Gregory S. Crespi, Overcoming the Legal Obstacles to the Creation of a Futures
10.
Market in Bodily Organs, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 8-9 (1994) ("Several factors have combined
over the past few decades to give rise to a tremendous increase in the need for bodily
organs that can be transplanted into recipients suffering from organ failure. First, and
most importantly, there have been dramatic advances in the technology of organ
transplantation. The refinement of surgical techniques, the invention of sophisticated
surgical support and life-maintenance equipment such as respirators, ventilators, and
dialysis machines, and the development of highly effective immuno-suppressant drugs have
combined to make organ transplantation a common and almost routine procedure with a
high survival rate. At least twenty-five different bodily tissues and fluids have been
transplanted in human beings, including key internal organs such as kidneys, hearts,
livers, and pancreases. Second, a variety of nutritional and medical factors have interacted
to increase average lifespans, and older persons obviously face higher probabilities of organ
failure." (footnotes omitted)).
Andrew Chin, Research in the Shadow of DNA Patents, 87 J. PAT & TRADEMARK
11.
OFF. SOC'Y 846, 846 (2005) (recognizing the existence and level of patenting proliferations).
Chin argues:
Since the U.S. Supreme Court's 1980 Diamond v. Chakrabartydecision, in which
the Court ruled that a genetically-altered bacterium is a "nonnaturally occurring
manufacture or composition of matter" eligible for a U.S. patent, the issuance of
patents on genetic material has become commonplace. Decisions of the Federal
Circuit, established in 1982, have consistently held that 'isolated and purified'
DNA molecules excised from genes are patentable if they are useful, novel,
nonobvious and adequately disclosed.
Id. (citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309-10 (1980)). It should be noted,
however, that Chin attempts to rebut the assertions and well-established doctrines
allowing the patenting of DNA molecules. See id. at 904-05. He contends that critics of
DNA patenting could "demonstrate that the patenting of DNA molecules will have the
effect of retarding the identification and sequencing of [too] many other useful DNA
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and the 1980s, the biotechnology-pharmaceutical industry in the U.S.
grew exponentially, fueled in part by the technological advances of the
twentieth century and the innovative patenting environment
encouraged in the United States beginning in the 1970s. 12 In the late
twentieth century, the infertility "solving" market in the United
States began generating considerable interest due to the
acknowledged numbers (estimated from ten to fifteen percent of the
adult population) of infertile people: 13 infertility met big business. The
drive to reproduce is tremendous. It is axiomatic that, for the human
race, reproduction is high on the list of survival priorities. When
confronted with the inability to procreate, the anxious, infertile person
will often pay tremendous sums to alleviate this problem. 14 As a
result, the use of ART1 5 to address infertility became a $3 billion
16
industry in the United States by the late 1990s.
Meanwhile, new technologies for the curing of disease and the
repairing of injuries continued to fuel market demand for human

molecules." Id. Such a demonstration, if successful, could condemn DNA patenting as
inimical to "progress." Id. at 905.
12,
See Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2000) (giving universities, businesses,
non-profit groups, and other recipients of federal research funds intellectual property
rights over their resulting inventions); see also Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation
Act of 1980, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3718 (2000) (attempting to promote technology by
establishing organizations to stimulate technology and recognizing individuals who make
significant technological contributions); Lorelei Ritchie de Larena, The Price of Progress:
Are Universities Adding to the Cost?, 43 HOuS. L. REV. 1373 (2007) (criticizing the BayhDole Act, discussing its effect on universities and industries, and examining its role in the
subsidization of the biotechnology industry and the advancement of technology).
13.
See SPAR, supra note 3, at 1 n.1 ("Estimating infertility statistics is notoriously
difficult. Ten percent is the figure suggested by the American Society for Reproductive
Medicine." (citations omitted)); American Society for Reproductive Medicine, Frequently
Asked Questions About Infertility, http://www.asrm.org/Patients/faqs.html (last visited
Apr. 7, 2008) [hereinafter ASRM FAQ] ("Infertility affects about 6.1 million women and
their partners in the U.S.-about ten percent of the reproductive-age population." (citing
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, NATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY GROWTH

(1995), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/about/major/nsfg/nsfgl-5doc.htm)).
14.
See SPAR, supra note 3, at 1-2.
15.
"ARTs," "Assisted reproductive technology," and "reproductive technologies" are
terms used to identify techniques developed "to facilitate [the] fertilization of human
gametes in order to enable pregnancy." Lyria Bennett Moses, Understanding Legal
Responses to Technological Change: The Example of In Vitro Fertilization,6 MINN. J. L.
Sci. & TECH. 505, 512 (2005); see also Peter Lutjen et al., The Establishment and
Maintenance of Pregnancy Using In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Donation in a Patient
with Primary Ovarian Failure, 307 NATURE 174 (1984); Alan Trounson & Linda Mohr,
Human Pregnancy Following Cryopreservation, Thawing and Transfer of an Eight-Cell
Embryo, 305 NATURE 707 (1983).
16.
See SPAR, supra, note 3, at 3 ("In 2004, more than one million Americans
underwent some form of fertility treatment, participating in what had become a nearly $3
billion industry ....
").

650

VANDERBILTJ. OFENTERTAINMENTAND TECH. LAW [Vol. 10:3:643

tissue and body parts. 17 As the new human tissue/body parts
commodification,
about
questions
developed,
marketplace
8 In response to
raised.'
were
concerns
commercialization, and ethical
these concerns, legislative regulatory controls were widely imposed in
the fields of organ transplants, tissue transplants, and the use of
human body parts for experimentation and research.19
Surprisingly, the ART marketplace was subject to a negligible
amount of regulatory control in comparison with other tissue transfer
marketplaces in the economy. In fact, the present regulatory system
could be characterized as fragmented with unenforceable private
fertility clinic standards and an uninvolved20 federal government that
previously ignored issues related to fertility.

See Julia D. Mahoney, The Market for Human Tissue, 86 VA. L. REV. 163, 22217.
23 (2000) ("Due to dramatic advances in medical technology and scientific knowledge, the
potential worth-both economic and non-economic--of the body of one individual to others
has never been higher.").
See Marjorie M. Shultz, Questioning Commodification, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1841,
18.
(1997) (reviewing MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES: THE TROUBLE WITH
TRADE IN SEX, CHILDREN, BODY PARTS, AND OTHER THINGS (Harvard Univ. Press 1996)).
Radin offers a critique of the contemporary trend in American culture toward the use of
market models and market rhetoric in treating persons and experiences as commodities.
Id. at 1841. Radin perceives this commodification process "in our discourse, our concepts,
our self-understanding, our politics, our law, and, of course, in our commercial markets,"
and contends that this commodification impoverishes our selfhood. Id. at 1841-42. See
generally Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 497 (Cal. 1990) (Arabian, J.,
concurring) (describing the problem of selling one's body tissue for profit as an inclement
degradation of "the human vessel-the single most venerated and protected subject in any
civilized society").
See Mahoney, supra note 17, at 177-78. The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
19.
as originally drafted was silent on the issue of whether human sources of organs
(or their survivors or estates) could receive payments. The question of direct
payments to organ sources or to their survivors was resolved with the passage of
the National Organ Transplant Act ('NOTA') in 1984, which prohibited payments
for any organ to be used for transplantation. In addition, many state statutes
forbid payments for transplantable organs. The critical shortages of many
transplantable organs have sparked extensive and well-publicized debates over
whether applicable law should be changed to permit the offering of compensation
to tissue sources or to their surviving relatives.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
See SPAR, supra note 3; Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, The "Orwellian Nightmare"
20.
Reconsidered: A Proposed Regulatory Framework for the Advanced Reproductive
Technologies, 25 GA. L. REV. 625, 692 (1991) ("[Tihe current system [of fertility regulation]
is a de facto incremental regulatory system by virtue of the federal government's limited
attention, the medical profession's development of [their own] guidelines and the states'
activity in areas of perceived critical state interest.").
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A. Technology
Assisted reproductive technologies are the direct result of
technological change. An all-encompassing definition of technology
may be difficult to frame. Usually it involves all
"of those material objects, techniques and knowledge that allow human beings to
transform and control the inanimate world." A broader definition would include
control of the animate world, such as: "man's use of devices or systematic patterns
of thought and activity to control physical phenomena in
order to serve his desires
21
with a minimum of effort and a maximum of efficiency."

The ART market developed as science and innovation met the laws of
supply and demand in the American marketplace in the midst of rapid
22
technological change.

21.
Moses, supra note 15, at 512 (quoting RON WESTRUM, TECHNOLOGIES AND
SOCIETY: THE SHAPING OF PEOPLE AND THINGS 7 (1991); RALPH PARKMAN, THE
CYBERNETIC SOCIETY 3 (1972)).

22.
Certain terms used in this article are interchangeable, such as "collaborative
reproduction" and "assisted reproduction technology." Other terms are given specific
scientific definitions that are utilized in the medical reproductive field and adopted in
statutory or common law.
Assisted reproductive technology describes various techniques that can be used to assist
women in becoming pregnant. For purposes of this article, the term is used to describe
various medical technologies used to create offspring through means other than coital
reproduction. See Paula J. Manning, Baby Needs a New Set of Rules: Using Adoption
Doctrine To Regulate Embryo Donation, 5 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 677, 682-83 (2004) (offering
definitions of the various ART techniques). Originally, ART was implemented as
fertilization in a test tube where ovum and sperm were commingled to produce a fertilized
egg. Egg donation is defined as a reproductive process where one or more eggs (human ova)
are removed from a donor and transferred to a recipient. Artificial insemination is the
assisted insemination of sperm, whether belonging to the intended parent or a donor, into
the uterus for impregnation.
In in vitro fertilization (IVF), eggs are surgically removed from the ovary and mixed
with sperm outside the body in a Petri dish. In vitro literally means "in glass." After about
forty hours, the eggs are examined, and eggs that have become fertilized by the sperm and
are dividing are then placed in the woman's uterus. See id.; ASRM FAQ, supra note 13; see
also Kimberly Berg, Note, Special Respect: For Embryos and Progenitors,74 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 506, 506 n. 1 (2006) ("ART includes all fertility treatments in which both eggs and
sperm are handled. In general, ART procedures involve surgically removing eggs from a
woman's ovaries, combining them with sperm in the laboratory, and returning them to the
woman's body or donating them to another woman. They do NOT include treatments in
which only sperm are handled (i.e., intrauterine-or artificial-insemination) or procedures
in which a woman takes drugs only to stimulate egg production without the intention of
having eggs retrieved."' (quoting CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 2002 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES

3 (2002), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ART/ARTO2/PDF/ART2002partl.pdf)). Citing the
balancing of contractual theories and the need for protections of procreative liberties, Berg
contends that courts faced with disputes between divorcing couples over the disposition of
frozen embryos should adopt an "absolute veto" approach whereby the party asserting a
right to avoid procreation should always prevail. Id. at 517-21.
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B. Historicaland Technological Context

In current assisted reproductive procedures, multiple fertilized
eggs are transferred, and multiple births are often the result. There
has not been any definitive longitudinal studies of the live births to
determine whether a disproportionate number have suffered
developmental problems. Quite often, not all of the fertilized eggs are
transferred, producing embryos preserved in frozen hydrogen for
23
future use. The viability of these embryos has not been determined.
In most states, gametes (eggs and sperm) are bought and sold
outright unlike other body tissues. Agencies and brokers actively
recruit young women as egg donors. 24 These donor eggs are then
marketed to infertile couples or individuals seeking in vitro
fertilization (IVF). 25 Typically, the customers can view photos of the
donors and learn about their physical attributes, history, medical
profile, accomplishments, intellectual acumen, and psychological
profile. 26 Some agencies even provide live interviews with potential
See Phillip C. Cato, The Hidden Costs of Fertility, 20 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL
23.
COMMENT. 45, 52 (2005); see also Charles P. Kindregan, Jr. & Maureen McBrien, Embryo
Donation: Unresolved Legal Issues in the Transfer of Surplus Cryopreserved Embryos, 49
VILL. L. REV. 169, 170-71 (2004) ("Hundreds of thousands of cryopreserved embryos lie
frozen in fertility banks throughout the United States. They are the by-products of
Couples typically fertilize about a
infertility treatments that began in the early 1970s ....
dozen eggs in vitro and freeze the extra embryos that are not immediately implanted."
(footnotes omitted)).
See Kari L. Karsjens, Boutique Egg Donations: A New Form of Racism and
24.
Patriarchy,5 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 57, 62 (2002) ("Recruitment practices range from
private 'egg brokers' to medical centers with affiliated fertility clinics to freestanding,
independent fertility centers."); see also IntraMed America, http://www.integramed.coml
inmdweb/?gclid=CP3KkNeDzZICFQIgPAodpEewHg (last visited Apr. 7, 2008) (providing a
national network of fertility centers).
Russell Korobkin, Buying and Selling Human Tissues for Stem Cell Research,
25.
49 ARIZ. L. REV. 45, 49 (2007) ("Agencies recruit women as potential egg donors and
actively market their eggs to infertile couples who wish to purchase ova for in vitro
fertilization and, hopefully, the creation of a baby."). Korobkin opines that the "nearly
unanimous opinion in the medical research and public policy communities that tissue
donors should be subject to a no-compensation rule is misguided and that purchasing
tissues for biomedical research should be both legal and socially acceptable." Id. at 47; see
supra note 22 (providing a definition of IVF); see also ASRM FAQ, supra note 13 ("In IVF,
eggs are surgically removed from the ovary and mixed with sperm outside the body in a
Petri dish ('in vitro' is Latin for 'in glass'). After about 40 hours, the eggs are examined to
see if they have become fertilized by the sperm and are dividing into cells. These fertilized
eggs (embryos) are then placed in the women's uterus, thus bypassing the fallopian
tubes.").
26.
Korobkin, supra note 25, at 49; see Karsjens, supra note 24, at 62; see also
Baum, supra note 3, at 117 (describing the egg donation process and insisting that
"[w]hichever process is used, individual donor selection is usually driven by the donor's
genetic, physical, psychological, and intellectual characteristics, which ... may or may not
have any bearing on the resultant offspring's characteristics").
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egg donors. 27 "Donors who are selected . .. typically receive between
28
$2,500 and $10,000 for one ovulation cycle."
The next medical step in this process is relatively
straightforward from a technical point of view. Now that physicians
understand and have perfected the technique for fertilizing eggs and
transferring the resulting embryo back into a womb, all that is needed
is to coordinate the donor female's and the donee female's reproductive
cycles. The drug Pergonal, or its equivalent, is used to cause super
ovulation in the donor, and progesterone or an equivalent drug is used
29
to prepare the recipient's womb for pregnancy.
The donor is subjected to a three-week course of hormone
therapy, which includes daily injections to stimulate the ovaries to
produce the eggs. The donor makes several trips to the doctor's office
during this time to determine whether the eggs are "ripe."30 At the
appropriate time, the eggs are harvested. The procedure involves an
ultrasound probe during which the eggs are removed from the ovaries
31
with a needle.
The private agencies that match the donors to the recipients
usually receive a fee for their services. Sperm donation operates
differently. Sperm banks serve as intermediaries that pay donors
directly for providing sperm to the bank. The amount paid for sperm
is considerably less: from $25 to $100 per donation, although
acceptable sperm undergoes a typical markup to as much as $275 to
32
$400 per vial.

27.

Korobkin, supra note 25, at 49.

28.
Id.; see Andrew Wancata, No Value for a Pound of Flesh: Extending MarketInalienability of the Human Body, 18 J.L. & HEALTH 199, 221 (2003-2004) ("Indeed, sperm
and ova have become market commodities, reaching bids from prospective purchasers as
high as $15,000 and $50,000, respectively. The Advanced Fertility Center of Chicago has
published that its current charge for a complete egg donation cycle is $18,200, which
includes 'the donor's fee of $5,000."' (footnotes omitted)). The estimates for egg donations
vary widely. This author visited the Massachusetts Institute of Technology on April 29,
2007, and saw an egg donor solicitation advertisement promising only $5,000 per
successful implantation of the egg.
29.
See SPAR, supra note 3, at 20, 24; Baum, supra note 3, at 117-18 (describing the
synchronization of the donor's and recipient's menstrual cycles and the hormonal
manipulation required to reach the intended results).
30.
See SPAR, supra note 3, at 43.
31.
See id.; see also Baum, supra note 3, at 118.
32.
See Korobkin, supra note 25, at 50; see also SPAR, supra note 3, at 39 ("All these
banks, however operate along similar financial lines. Donors are wooed through
promotional material scattered around college campuses or other attractive locales. They
contribute a fixed number of times over a relatively short period and receive around $75
per specimen. Each specimen yields between three and six vials of sperm, and each vial sell
for $250 to $400-a gross markup for the banks that averages roughly 2,000 percent.")
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In 2003, the average price paid by the infertile was
approximately $12,400 per cycle, "only slightly more than the
inflation-adjusted price" of $6,000 in 1986.33 An infertile couple or
individual may expend upwards of $50,000 to $100,000 attempting to
obtain a successful pregnancy. 34 Apparently, this is not too much to
pay for the desperate clientele seeking to "have a baby" with certain
characteristics.3 5 Certainly the price incentives are sufficient to make
the "ART baby business" a lucrative one.
C. CongressionalHistory
In 1979, President Jimmy Carter appointed an Ethics Advisory
Board (EAB) to address research issues involving ART, specifically in
vitro fertilization.3 6 On May 4, 1979, the board issued a report stating
that it was "acceptable from an ethical standpoint to undertake and
fund research involving human -VF and embryo transfer subject to
various qualifications." 37 The EAB dodged the issue of the morality of
human embryo research and research for IVF purposes by stating
'the human embryo is entitled to profound respect; but this respect
does not necessarily encompass the full legal and moral rights
attributed to persons."'38
The Carter, Reagan, and first Bush
administrations subsequently denied funding for this Board. 39
Federally funded research on embryos had to be approved by this
board, and without the board's approval, federally funded research on
40
embryos was virtually eliminated.

33.
See SPAR, supra note 3, at 33.
34.
Id. at 46.
35.
See generally id. (discussing a couple that placed an ad seeking "a Caucasian
woman 'with proven college level athletic ability' willing to 'give the gift of life and love"').
36.
Moses, supra note 15, at 539.
37.
Id. (citing Report and Conclusions: HEW Support of Research Involving Human
In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer, 44 Fed. Reg. 35,033, 35,056 (June 18, 1979)).
38.
Id. (quoting 44 Fed. Reg. at 35,056). "The Board recommended that a model or
uniform law be drafted dealing with the legal status of children born as a result of IVF." Id.
39.
Id. "This Board approval requirement was removed in 1993." Id. (citing
National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-43, § 121, 107
Stat. 122, 133 (1993)).
40.
See id.; cf. Eggen, supra note 20, at 684-85 ("[Tlhe Board approved such
research with the following provisos: '1. The research complies with all appropriate
provisions of the regulations governing research with human subjects ... ; 2. The research
is designed primarily: (A) to establish the safety and efficacy of embryo transfer and (B) to
obtain important scientific information toward that end not reasonably attainable by other
means; 3. Human gametes used in such research will be obtained exclusively from persons
who have been informed of the nature and purpose of the research in which such materials
will be used and have specifically consented to such use; 4. No embryos will be sustained in
vitro beyond the stage normally associated with the completion of implantation (14 days
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In this environment, devoid of significant federal or state
funding, from 1980 to 1992, private funding increased. 4 1 Without
government funding and subsequent oversight, privately funded
researchers were free to push the frontiers of ART, expanding and
improving techniques. 42 Improved medical technology, coupled with
increased knowledge, fueled increasing consumer demand for the
emerging fertility services.
EAB approval for federally funded
research in this area was totally eliminated by 1996. 43 Thus, the lack
of initial federal funding for embryonic and genetic research created a
vacuum of federally sponsored research that was filled by private
entrepreneurs, private research facilities, and medical universities in
44
the fertility industry.
after fertilization); and 5. All interested parties and the general public will be advised if
evidence begins to show that the procedure entails risk of abnormal offspring higher than
those associated with natural human reproduction."' (quoting 44 Fed. Reg. at 35,057)).
41.
See Judith F. Daar, ART and the Search for Perfectionism:On Selecting Gender,
Genes, and Gametes, 9 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 241, 255 n.36 (2005) ("There are no federal
laws or regulations that directly prohibit the use of embryos in privately funded research
protocols. Thus, current research in PGD [(preimplantation genetic diagnosis)] is largely
supported by private benefactors.").
42.
See Gabriel S. Gross, Comment, Federally Funding Human Embryonic Stem
Cell Research:An Administrative Analysis, 2000 WIs. L. REV. 855, 883 ("Stem cell research
will occur in the private sector regardless of whether it is funded by the federal
government. Through private funding, the research will proceed, potentially unregulated
by the government and unknown to the public at large. Federal funding confers a distinct
benefit to scientific research, that of strictly enforced oversight processes that are absent
from privately funded work. Furthermore, making the vast resources of the federal
government available to ES cell researchers will diminish scientists' reliance on private
funds, creating a powerful incentive for independent research organizations to conform to
federal ethical guidelines.").
43.
See Susan L. Crockin, The "Embryo" Wars: At the Epicenter of Science, Law,
Religion, and Politics, 39 FAM. L.Q. 599, 620 (2005) (outlining the federal disengagement
from genetic and fertility research by explaining the history of the EAB and subsequent
Dickey Amendment through the latter Bush administration). "Under the Clinton
administration, the Dickey Amendment was interpreted to mean research was permitted
so long as federal funding was not used to create the stem cell lines, because creation of the
lines would involve destruction of embryos." Id. The Dickey Amendment is a rider that was
attached to a Department of Health and Human Services appropriations bill in 1996. Id.
(citing Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act
(OCESAA), Pub. L. No. 104-99, Title I, § 128, 110 Stat. 26, 34 (1996)).
44.
See Note, Guiding Regulatory Reform in Reproduction and Genetics, 120 HARV.
L. REV. 574 (2006) (examining the social, political, and economic forces that produced the
modern day divergence between genetic research which utilized the techniques in
reproductive medicine and the reproductive medicine field). The note acknowledges that
the two fields have spawned very different regulatory regimes. Assisted
reproduction is now dominated by private firms that provide reproductive
services, including fertility treatments, to parents willing to pay, operating under
only a minimal set of guidelines with little formal oversight. In contrast, most
genetic research remains tightly regulated by overlapping federal agencies, with
funding subject to the approval and oversight of review boards that scrutinize
the ethical, safety, and policy concerns of new research.
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The National Institutes of Health (NIH), an administrative
agency under the auspices of the Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS), decided that "federal funds could be used for
research using donated surplus IVF embryos remaining after
infertility treatments." 45 Congress immediately "attached a rider [(the
Dickey Amendment)] to a Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS) appropriations bill, which effectively prohibited federal
46
funding for any research in which a human embryo is destroyed."
The amendment was attached before any funding was granted for
The Dickey Amendment has been attached to every
research.
subsequent DHHS appropriations bill. The Clinton administration
interpreted the Dickey Amendment broadly, permitting research with
federal funding as long as the "funding was not used to create the
stem cell lines, because creation of the lines would involve destruction
of embryos."

47

NIH implemented those regulatory guidelines, which remained
until 2001. Those guidelines provided that "federal funds could be
used for the study of stem cells derived from excess human embryos
remaining after infertility treatments, so long as the extraction of the
stem cells from the IVF embryos was privately funded and completed

Id. at 574 (footnotes omitted). The note identifies stem cell research on embryos as an
example of the tightly controlled research. Id. The note concludes that there is a
"convergence between reproductive medicine and genetic research creat[ing] dilemmas for
current regulation" but strongly argues that any reform should "consider the past forces
that have contributed to today's regulatory divide," for example, the funding prohibitions
and lack of governmental oversight in one area in the face of strong market forces. Id. at
596. The note further argues that potential tools for reform should consider the
implications of past policy decisions and consider
that funding-oriented regulation may be effective for early-stage research, that
there may be a large cultural capacity to absorb new technologies, and that
safety concerns ought to be heightened in the face of strong market forces ....
[T]hese insights, drawn from the hard experience of history, should offer useful
guidance as today's speculative ethical debates develop into concrete realities.
Id.
Crockin, supra note 43, at 620; see Christine L. Feiler, Note, Human Embryo
45.
Experimentation:Regulation and Relative Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2435, 2449 (1998)
("The NIH Panel believed that the public's interest in obtaining beneficial information from
these experiments warranted performance of (and federal funding for) embryo
experimentation-even where it involved the deliberate creation of research embryos.").
46.
Crockin, supra note 43, at 620 (citing Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act (OCESAA), Pub. L. No. 104-99, Title I, § 128, 110 Stat.
26, 34 (1996)).
47.
Id.; see also National Institutes of Health Guidelines for Research Using
Human Pluripotent Stem Cells, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,976 (Aug. 25, 2000) (withdrawn by
National Institutes of Health Guidelines for Research Using Human Pluripotent Stem
Cells, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,107 (Nov. 14, 2001)).
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prior to the NIH funded research."48 In August 2001, President
George W. Bush announced a narrower construction of the Dickey
Amendment, allowing federal funds to be used for research on existing
stem cell lines only. 49 The latter Bush Administration's realignment
of the definition of embryos potentially restricted any further federal
50
government funding of research on stem cell lines.
Currently, any research on stem cell lines remains in the
unregulated realm of private research and private funding. The
ultimate effect of the initial (1979) prohibition against federal funding
of research led to a possibly unintended result. The absence of
governmental oversight and funding of embryonic and genetic
research, combined with the lack of public debate on the assisted
reproductive technologies, freed private enterprises to pursue
advancing ARTs and test new, emergent applications on their
51
customers.
D. The Fertility Clinic Success Rate and CertificationAct of 1992
In 1988, the DHHS reconstituted the EAB. 52 The federal
government failed to issue or present new oversight regulations for
private research during the eighties. In 1990, in the wake of renewed
interest in regulation, a bill was passed authorizing the Secretary of
Health and Human Services to issue regulations for the certification of
embryo laboratories, and establishing certification standards and

48.
49.

Crockin, supra note 43, at 620.
See David Adamson, Regulation of Assisted Reproductive Technologies in the

United States, 39 FAM. L. Q. 727, 729-30 (2005) ("On August 9, 2001, President George W.
Bush announced criteria for federal funding of stem cell research, limiting it to sixty-four
stem cell lines in existence at that time.").
50.
See Crockin, supra note 43, at 620-21.
51.
See generally Korobkin, supra note 25, at 45 ("President Bush's policy permits
federal funding of research on human embryonic stem cell . . . lines only if they were
created prior to August 2001 and only if they were derived from embryos created without
financial compensation. The Stem Cell Research Enhancement Act, passed by Congress but
vetoed by President Bush in July 2006, would have expanded the scope of federal funding
but maintained the no-compensation requirement" for "any person who donates tissues for
stem cell research, including eggs, sperm, adult cells, or frozen early-stage embryos stored
at in vitro fertilization ...

clinics.").

52.
Ethics Advisory Board; Notice of Establishment, 53 Fed. Reg. 35,232 (Sept. 12,
1988); see also Gross, supra note 42, at 862 ("In response to the introduction of human in
vitro fertilization in the 1970s, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEWnow the Department of Health and Human Services) appointed an Ethical Advisory Board
(EAB), to consider and review all applications or proposals involving human IVF."). The
EAB was allowed to die during subsequent administrations before being revived in 1988.
Id. at 863.
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procedures.5 3 The bill contained a success rate reporting requirement
as a precondition of certification.5 4 The bill, known as the Fertility
Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992 (Fertility Success
Rate Act, or the FCSRCA), represents governmental regulation at its
55
weakest.
Although the FCSRCA was enacted in 1992, it was not
implemented until the DHHS actually funded its implementation in
1996.56 The two critical components of the Fertility Success Rate Act
include certification and statistical reporting of success. 57
The
reporting requirement for ART clinics involves the reporting of annual
pregnancy success rates.5 8 The Act required the success rates of the
reporting clinics be made available to the public. In addition, clinics

53.

See Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C. §§

263a-1 to -7 (2000).

54.
Id. § 263a-1(a).
55.
See Siddharth Khanijou, Multifetal Pregnancy Reduction in Assisted
Reproductive Technologies: A License To Kill? 8 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 403, 410-11
("In response to this concern, [questions about the accuracy of the reporting of fertility
clinics] Congress passed the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992 and
directed the Center for Disease Control (CDC) to collect and publish information regarding
fertility center success rates. However, this mandatory reporting requirement serves no
regulatory purpose and clinics continue to maximize pregnancy rates by transferring too
many embryos per cycle. Information regarding a clinic's success rates, originally intended
to serve a consumer-oriented purpose, has had the regrettable side-effect of promoting
unethical business practices ....
" (footnotes omitted)); see also Alicia Ouellette et al.,
Lessons Across The Pond:Assisted Reproductive Technology in the United Kingdom and the
United States, 31 AM. J.L. & MED. 419, 422-23 (2005) ("The FCSRCA mandates that
infertility clinics submit ART success rate data and describes the responsibilities of the
CDC in regard to data reporting and licensing.... The FCSRCA legislation, however, does
not go nearly as far as the HFE Act [a regulatory statute operating in the United
Kingdom]. It fails to give the CDC the authority to enforce the data-reporting requirement,
and simply outlines a voluntary system of licensing that has not been implemented or
enforced." (footnotes omitted)). See generally Crockin, supra note 43.
56.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 263a-1 to -7; Weldon E. Havins & James J. Dalessio, The EverWidening Gap Between the Science of Artificial Reproductive Technology and the Laws
Which Govern that Technology, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 825, 843-44 (1999); see also Reporting of
Pregnancy Success Rates from Assisted Reproductive Technology Programs, 65 Fed. Reg.
53,310 (Sept. 1, 2000) (setting forth the reporting requirements under the FCSRCA).
57.
See Havins & Dalessio, supra note 56, at 843-44 (noting the reporting and
certification components of the Act and opining that the certification component of the
statute was designed to "maximize the quality of IVF, assure consistent application of
established procedures, and guarantee accurate reporting"); Jennifer L. Rosato, The
Children of ART (Assisted Reproductive Technology): Should the Law Protect Them from
Harm?, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 57, 63 ("The information serves a worthwhile consumeroriented purpose: it allows intended parents to make knowledgeable choices about the
fertility center they will use.").
58.
42 U.S.C. § 263a-l(a).
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failing to report their rates would be publicly exposed for consumers to
see.

59

The reporting and certification requirements were enacted to
combat exaggerated claims of success rates by clinics. Thus, the
reporting requirements were created to serve the consumer and
provide knowledge about the fertility centers success rates with
pregnancy and birth. The certification requirements were crafted
with the intention of improving the quality of IVF and the procedures
used.
The Act defines "assisted reproductive technology" to mean
all treatments or procedures which include the handling of human oocytes or
embryos, including in vitro fertilization, gamete intrafallopian transfer, zygote
intrafallopian transfer, and such other specific technologies as the Secretary may
include in this definition, after making public any proposed definition in such
comment from any person (including any Federal or other
manner as to facilitate
60
public agency).

The Fertility Success Rate Act also directs the Secretary of Health and
Human Services to "develop a model program for the certification of
embryo laboratories ... to be carried out by the States" (which has yet
61
to be adopted).
The fertility clinics' reporting and certification data is collected
by the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), which is
under the DHHS. The success data includes actual pregnancies
(which may not result in actual births) and live births. 62 The CDC
then reports these statistics to the public. Insignificant sanctions are
imposed on a fertility clinic that fails to report its success rates or
actual pregnancies. 63 The failure to report simply causes the clinic to
64
be listed on the CDC Web site as non-reporting.

59.
42 U.S.C. § 263a-5(1)(A); see also Rosato, supra note 57, at 64.
60.
42 U.S.C. § 263a-7(1); see also 42 U.S.C. § 263a-7(2) (defining an "embryo
laboratory" as "a facility in which human oocytes are subject to assisted reproductive
technology treatment or procedures based on manipulation of oocytes or embryos which are
subject to implantation").
61.
42 U.S.C. § 263a-2.
See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
62.
HUMAN SERVS., ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
CLINIC
AND
FERTILITY
SUMMARY

TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES: NATIONAL
at
(2004),
available
REPORTS
6

http://ftp.cdc.gov/pub/Publications/art/2O04ART508.pdf [hereinafter ARS SUCCESS RATES].
The FCSRCA requires only an annual reporting of clinic success rates, a listing
63.
of clinics that do not report, and the development of a model certification program. 42
U.S.C. §§ 263a-1 to -7 (2000).
Id. § 263a-5(1)(A) (requiring that the Secretary publish and distribute to the
64.
States and public the "pregnancy success rates reported to the Secretary under section
263a-l(a)(1) of this title and, in the case of an assisted reproductive technology program
which failed to report one or more success rates as required under such section, the name
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Nothing in the Fertility Success Rate Act attempts to regulate
the standards, quality, or ethical issues, including compensation for
donors, involving ART and the use of donor eggs. 65 The Act, in fact,
contains a specific provision forbidding such regulations: "In
developing the certification program, the Secretary may not establish
any regulation, standard, or requirement which has the effect of
exercising supervision or control over the practice of medicine in
assisted reproductive technology programs."66
The data obtained from the CDC Web site contains information
related specifically to success rates and delivery rates. 67 The
information and data collected comes from a contract entered into
between the federal government and the associative organization
SART (Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology) for the collection
of the data. 68 While this collection methodology is not empirically
incorrect, it does underscore the close and collaborative arrangements
69
between the fertility industry providers and the federal government.
70
Figure 1

Breakdown of ART Procedures- 2003
0 % Using Freshly Fertilized
4%

Embryos from Patient's
Eggs
0% Using Thawed Embryos
from Patient's Eggs
7 % Using Freshly Fertilized
Embryos from Donor's
Eggs
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Eggs

of each such program and each pregnancy success rate which the program failed to

report"); see also Rosato, supra note 57, at 64.
65.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 263a-1 to -7.
66.
42 U.S.C. § 263a-2(i)(1).
67.
Victoria Clay Wright et al., Assisted Reproductive Technology SurveillanceUnited States, 2003, MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY. REP., May 26, 2006,
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ss5504a1.htm.
68.
See id. ("CDC contracted with the Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology

(SART) to obtain data from ART medical centers located in the United States."); see also
What Is SART?, http://www.sart.org/WhatIsSART.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2008).
69.
70.

See Wright et al., supra note 67.
See id.
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The statistics reported by the CDC provide a telling, but
incomplete, picture about the costs and societal implications of ART.
As shown in figure 1, nationwide, seventy-four percent of ART
procedures used freshly fertilized embryos from the patient's eggs,
fourteen percent used thawed embryos from the patient's eggs, eight
percent used freshly fertilized embryos from the donor's eggs, and four
percent used thawed embryos from donor eggs.
In interpreting the data, one has to measure the success rate of
ART when using the patient's eggs as compared to the success rate of
71
ART when using a donated egg.
Figure 272
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As shown in figure 2, in the year 2003, the latest year in which
statistics have been released for compilation in the completed reports,
"a total of 122,872 ART procedures were reported to the CDC." As a
result of these procedures, 35,785 live-birth deliveries occurred and
73
48,756 infants were born.

71.
Id.
72.
See id. ('Whether an ART procedure resulted in a pregnancy and live-birth
delivery varied according to... the patient's age, the type of ART procedure performed, the
number of embryos transferred, and embryo availability (an indicator of embryo quality).").
73.
Id. Live-birth deliveries include multiples born to the mother (twins and
triplets).
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Figure 374
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"Of [the] 48,756 infants born through ART procedures, 51%
were born in multiple-birth deliveries. ' 75 "The multiple-birth risk was
highest for women who underwent ART transfer procedures using
freshly fertilized embryos from either donor eggs (40%) or their own
eggs (34%)."76 Strong predictors of multiple birth risk include the
"[n]umber of embryos transferred, embryo availability (an indicator of
' 77
embryo quality), and [the] patient's age.

74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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78
Figures 4 and 4A
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"The highest live-birth rates were observed among ART
79
procedures using freshly fertilized embryos from donor eggs (51%)."
Yet the highest multiple birth risks in the ART procedures were
accounted for in those using freshly fertilized embryos from the
donor's eggs.8 0
The CDC's abstract highlights the problems of multiple births:
Patients who undergo ART treatments are more likely to deliver multiple-birth
infants than women who conceive naturally. Multiple births are associated with
increased risk for mothers and infants (e.g., pregnancy complications, premature
delivery, low-birthweight infants, and long-term disability among infants),.8

The Fertility Success Rate Act, with its reporting statistics, paints a
troubling picture. The ART procedures do not guarantee a successful
delivery of a live infant, and they come with a risk of multiple births.
The best success rate for a live birth from ART appears to occur with
donated eggs. If success is measured by both a live birth and a
reduced incidence of multiple births, then a new reporting paradigm
has to be created. Yet there are no attendant regulatory controls to
curtail overzealous implantation techniques or risky techniques. More
troubling is the reality that there are no regulatory measures to
ensure that the reporting is accurate. Clinics that fail to report are
82
merely listed on the site as non-reporting.

78.
See id. ("ART-related multiple births represent a sizable proportion of all
multiple births nationwide and in selected states. Efforts should be made to limit the
number of embryos transferred for patients undergoing ART. In addition, adverse infant
health outcomes (e.g., low birthweight and preterm delivery) should be considered when
assessing the efficacy and safety of ART.").

79.

Id.

80.
81.
82.

Id.
Id.
See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
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There does not appear to be any reporting of the consequences
of adverse [if any] reactions resulting to the donors from any of the
procedures to retrieve the eggs. Nor is there any attention paid to the
number of times eggs are retrieved from donors in any given locale.
The federal government has enacted a weak reporting statute for ART
clinics. 8 3 Correspondingly, through policies and political expediency,
the federal government has not proscribed the sale and transfer of
human gamete material. Instead, the result is that women can be
paid for donating eggs, and the regulation of ART is left to the private
players.
E. Human Tissue Transference
The second half of the twentieth century ushered in scientific
advances that allowed the successful transplant of a human organ into
a human being. These advances began with the transplant of a
human kidney, followed swiftly by a successful heart transplant in
South Africa.8 4 In stark contrast to the market for reproductive tissue
transfer, the organ transfer donation marketplace is highly regulated
by the federal government.
The transfer of organs and human tissue is regulated by
federal and state statutes that forbid the payment of monetary
compensation to the donors of human organs.8 5 The federal statute
that directly forbids monetary compensation payment is the National
Organ Transplant Act (NOTA).8 6 NOTA regulates the procurement
and transplantation of human organs.8 7 More specifically, NOTA
88
prohibits the buying or selling of organs for valuable consideration.
See Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C. §
83.
263a-l(a) (2000) (outlining the reporting requirements for ART clinics).
See S. Gregory Boyd, Considering a Market in Human Organs, 4 N.C. J. L. &
84.
TECH. 417, 420-21 (2003) (contending that the modern computer was invented more than a
decade before the first successful human organ transplant occurred, and noting that "[tlhe
first kidney was transplanted in 1951, the first lung in 1963, the first intestine in 1964, the
first liver in 1965, the first pancreas in 1966, and the first heart in 1967" (footnotes
omitted)); see also Crespi, supra note 10, at 11 n.46 ("In 1954 doctors performed the first
successful kidney transplant. In 1967 Dr. Christian Barnard made history by performing
the first human heart transplant." (citations omitted)); Wancata, supra note 28.
Wancata, supra note 28, at 213; see Charles M. Jordan, Jr. & Casey J. Price,
85.
First Moore, Then Hecht: Isn't It Time We Recognize a Property Interest in Tissues, Cells,
and Gametes?, 37 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 151, 159 n.35 (2002) (listing the statutes of
the states which have adopted the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) in some form and
asserting that all fifty states and the District of Columbia have adopted some version of the
1987 version of the UAGA).
National Organ Transplant Act of 1984, 42 U.S.C. §§ 273-274e (2000).
86.

87.

Id.

88.

Id. § 274e.
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It does not include blood, sperm, or ova in its definition of organs.8 9
NOTA was rushed through Congress in the 1980s to avoid what
Congress perceived as a rush to create for-profit marketing of human
organs. 90

All fifty states now have some form of statutory prohibition
against the sale of or compensation for human organs. 9 1 The National
Conference of Commissioners adopted the Uniform Anatomical Gift
Act (UAGA) in 1968, and subsequently revised it in 1987 and 2006.92
The UAGA allows anyone over eighteen years of age to make or refuse
an anatomical gift. 93 Similar to NOTA, the UAGA also forbids the
purchase or sale of body parts for transplantation or therapy if the
removal is intended to occur after death. This Act (adopted by all fifty
states and District of Columbia) was designed to facilitate the
transplantation of hearts and kidneys. 94 It does, however, encourage
the "voluntary, uncompensated donation of human organs." 95 The
"fear of commodification" of the human body underlies support for the
prohibition on organ sales. 96 During the hearings in the Senate before

89.
Id. § 274e(c)(1); see also Jordan, Jr. & Price, supra note 85, at 157 ("[T]he statute
specifically defines the term 'organ,' and the statute does not interpret an organ to include
blood, sperm, and ova."); Korobkin, supra note 25, at 47 n.12 ("The legislative history of the
NOTA specifically states that that statute's prohibition of sales 'is not meant to include
blood and blood derivatives, which can be replenished and whose donation does not
compromise the health of the donor."' (quoting S. REP. NO. 98-382, at 16-17 (1984), as
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3975, 3982)).
90.
See Wancata, supra note 28, at 213-14 ("In enacting NOTA, Congress intended
to prevent for-profit marketing of human organs. Interestingly, this legislation was rushed
through Capitol Hill due to the plans of a Virginia physician to arrange a commercial
market in human kidneys.... The proposition shocked many and was met with immediate
congressional dissent, including then-Tennessee Senator Albert Gore, Jr., [who]
vehemently contended that 'putting organs on a market basis is abhorrent to our system of
values."' (footnotes omitted)).
91.
See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
92.
UNIF. ANATOMICAL GiFT ACT § 1 et seq. (West 2008).
93.
Id. § 2(a).
94.
Id.; see also Crespi, supra note 10, at 14-15 ("NOTA ... created the National
Organ Procurement and Transplantation network as a vehicle for matching organ donors
with those who need transplants."); Jordan, Jr. & Price, supra note 85, at 158 ("In an effort
to facilitate the transplantation of hearts and kidneys, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act.").
95.
Wancata, supra note 28, at 214.
96.
See id. at 215 ("[Clompensation to organ donors has been widely attacked as
espousing the notion that people may become viewed as market commodities."). The fear is
that, if human body parts are granted full property rights, "we would become slaves, not in
a market for our bodies, but in a market for body parts." Id. (quotation marks omitted)
(footnote omitted). For an annotation of cases concerning the validity of state and federal
acts, see Marjorie A. Shields, Validity and Application of Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, 6
A.L.R. 6TH 365 (2005).
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NOTA was passed, the Committee Report in Congress identified the
97
commodification issue as a reason for the need for this bill.
NOTA is the primary federal law regulating the procurement,
distribution, and transplantation of human organs. 98
The Act
provides regulatory direction on both organ procurement and
donation. It is a complete statutory prohibition against obtaining
valuable consideration in exchange for human organs.
NOTA
also
created
the
Organ
Procurement
and
Transplantation Network (OPTN), which facilitates, through privately
and government-funded organizations, the waiting lists, protocols, and
procurement procedures for organ donation and transplantation. 99
The Act provides for fines up to $50,000 and/or five years in jail as
punishment for selling organs. l0 More restrictive than the UAGA,
NOTA prohibits the selling of organs during the life and after the
death of the donor if the sale could be interpreted to affect interstate
101
commerce.
Although NOTA prohibits the sale of organs, estimates show a
billion dollar unregulated industry in the transfer of human tissues
through middle men and brokers. 10 2 All manner of persons are
engaged in this perfectly legitimate grey market. 0 3 NOTA prohibits
the donor or his family from receiving valuable consideration in
exchange for tissue or an organ, but the participants can receive costs
for tissue retrieved, stored, rendered, and transplanted, as well as a
10 4
reasonable fee as the tissue moves from one broker to another.

97.
S. REP. No. 98-382, at 17 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3975, 3982
("The Committee believes that human body parts should not be viewed as commodities...
."1).

98.
See 42 U.S.C. § 273 (2000).
99.
See 42 U.S.C. § 274 (2000); Organ Procurement and Transplant Network,
http://www.optn.org (last visited Apr. 9, 2008) (reporting that there were 98,793 waiting
list candidates for organ transplants as of April 9, 2008, at 17:27 EST).
100. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(b) (2000).
101.
See id. § 274e(a).
102.
See Michelle Oberman, When the Truth Is Not Enough: Tissue Donation,
Altruism, and the Market, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 903, 910-11 (2006).
103.
See id. (commenting on the largely unregulated human tissue market). The
market in human tissue sprung up in the late-twentieth and early-twenty-first centuries
and involves the procurement of body parts from human cadavers. Id. at 903. It involves
the "recycling of skin, bone and other body parts" and subsequent sale and resale to various
brokers and middlemen. Id. "Over the course of the past twenty years, some participants in
this market have realized extraordinary profits." Id.; see also Robert A. Katz, The Re-Gift of
Life: Who Should Capture the Value of TransplantedHuman Tissue, 18 No. 4 HEALTH LAW
14, 14 (2006) (chronicling the billion-dollar industry existing in the United States for the
recovery of "tissue (e.g., bone, skin, heart valves)" from cadavers and its transfer into living
persons).
104.
See Oberman, supra note 102, at 910.
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F. Regulatory Oversight of Human Reproductive Tissue Transfer
Three federal agencies and three separate federal legislative
enactments 10 5 provide some regulatory oversight of the reproductive
technology industry. 106 At best, this federal oversight is fragmented,
and state regulatory oversight for reproductive fertility services is
virtually nonexistent.
The DHHS oversees the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), 10 7 the CDC,10 8 and the Centers for Medicaid
and Medicare Services (CMS). 10 9
The FDA has the authority, although limited, to regulate
genetic testing.1 1 0 The FDA passed regulations to "screen and test cell
and tissue donors, in a way that prevents the introduction,

105.
See Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C. §§
263a-1 to -7 (2000); see also Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988, 42
U.S.C. § 263a (2000) (amending section 253 of the Public Health Service Act); Social
Security Act of 1965, Titles XVIII & XIX, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1396v (2000); Adamson, supra
note 49, at 728-29 ("Numerous general mandatory regulations affect ART in a direct and
indirect manner. The Federal Clinical Laboratory Improvement Act of 1988 (CLIA 88)
governs endocrinology and andrology laboratories that provide hormonal assays and semen
analysis tests, respectively, for IVF. The National Institutes of Health (NIH) and federal
research regulations cover all human research, including that performed in IVF
laboratories. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has regulations that govern SCNT,
and other federal government laws restrict research on embryos, SCNT, and stem cell
research. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has intervened to sanction ART clinics
that have marketed or advertised their results in a manner that the FTC considered
inappropriate.... The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) sets payment
levels for all medical services, including those provided by ART centers. Even though
Medicare and Medicaid do not pay for IVF, the setting of reimbursement levels in general
has a direct effect on payments by insurance companies and others to ART centers.").
106.
See Adamson, supra note 49, at 729 ("These federal policies have had the
primary impact of limiting human embryo research and support for reproductive research,
including stem cell research.").
107.
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399a (2000).
108.
42 U.S.C. §§ 264-272 (2000 & Supp. II 2002); 42 C.F.R. pts. 70-71 (2007).
109.
42 C.F.R. pts. 400-505 (2007).
110.
See U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Human Gene Therapy and the Role of
the Food and Drug Administration (Sept. 2000), http://www.fda.gov/cber/infosheets/
genezn.htm ("The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is the primary government
agency charged with protecting the health of U.S. citizens . .

.

. The FDA's authority

includes any human gene therapy product sold in the United States."); see also Adamson,
supra note 49, at 730 ("Regulations affecting genetics also impact ART in an increasing
manner, because of the application of preimplantation genetic diagnosis and screening
(PGD/S), which is performed by testing cells biopsied from embryos that have been created
by lVF. The DHHS oversees genetic tests through the CDC, FDA, CMS and Office for
Human Research Protection (OHRP). The CLIA has laboratory oversight, and the NIH
oversees genetics research activities."); Larry Thompson, Human Gene Therapy: Harsh
Lessons,

High

Hopes,

FDA

CONSUMER

MAG.,

http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/2000/500-gene.html.

Sept.-Oct.

2000,

available at
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transmission, or spread of communicable diseases.""'
These
minimum health standards became effective on May 25, 2005.112 The
FDA exercises jurisdiction over facilities donating, processing, or
storing sperm, ova, and embryos through its power to prevent the
spread of communicable disease and its power to regulate drugs,
1 3
devices, and biological products. 1
The CDC has oversight authority over fertility clinics for the
purpose of reporting statistics required under the Fertility Success
Rate Act. 114 As we have seen, however, the Act merely requires the
clinics to report their success rates as indicated by actual pregnancies
or live births. 115 The CDC has no power to sanction the clinics for
noncompliance except to list the noncompliant clinics on their Web
site.1 1 6 The CDC does have oversight authority, based on its enabling
statute, 117 to regulate the spread of communicable diseases, but it is
clear from its regulations that it does not have the authority to do
anything more with fertility clinics."18 Note that, for the 2004 report,
of the 411 reporting clinics, only twenty-eight were chosen for a site
audit to determine that the tabulated success rates were accurate.1 1 9
The CMS has oversight authority over non-research
laboratories concerning standards, personnel, and guidelines.' 20 A

111.
21 C.F.R. § 1271.145 (2007); see also U.S. Food and Drug Administration,
Tissues, http://www.fda.gov/CBER/tiss.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2008) ("Human cells or
tissue intended for implantation, transplantation, infusion, or transfer into a human
recipient is regulated as a human cell, tissue, and cellular and tissue-based product or
HCT/P. The Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER) regulates HCT/Ps under
21 CFR Parts 1270 and 1271. Examples of such tissues are bone, skin, corneas, . . . heart
valves ....
oocytes and semen.").
112.
See 21 C.F.R. pts. 210-11, 820, 1271 (2007); Eligibility Determination for
Donors of Human Cells, Tissues, and Cellular and Tissue-Based Products, 69 Fed. Reg.
29,786 (May 25, 2004).
113.
See Human Cells, Tissues, and Cellular and Tissue-Based Products;
Establishment Registration and Listing, 68 Fed. Reg. 2689 (Jan. 21, 2003).
114.
Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C. §§ 263a-1
to -7 (2000); Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Division of Reproductive Health:
Activities-ART
Surveillance
System,
http://www.cdc.gov/ReproductiveHealth/DRH/
activities/ART.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2008).
115.
See 42 U.S.C. § 263a-1.
116.
See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
117.
42 U.S.C. §§ 264-272 (2000 & Supp.II 2002).
118.
See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
119.
ART SUCCESs RATES, supra note 62, at 5.
120.
See 42 C.F.R. § 493.2 (2007); Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services,
Medicare Overview, http://www.cms.hhs.govfMedicareGenInfo/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2008)
(noting that Medicare is a government-sponsored health care insurance program for
individuals who have certain disabilities or are over the age of sixty-five and is essentially
health care for indigent individuals); Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Clinical
Laboratory Improvement Amendments, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/CLIA/ (last visited Mar.
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review of the enabling statute makes it clear that this federal agency
has not exercised oversight authority on ART applications. However,
the clinics do operate under some form of self-regulation. 121 Because
they are not operating within fields classified as research, clinics are
generally free to offer new applications and reproductive options,
limited only by the practitioner's judgment. The demands of buyers,
suppliers, and consumers drive this market. Consumer demand for
fertility treatments, coupled with the ability of fertility clinics to
develop new reproductive techniques, create strong incentives to offer
122
new applications.
The CMS has some regulatory authority over medical clinics
pursuant to the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of
1988 (CLIA). 123 The CMS has not used its powers under the CLIA,
which sets standards for laboratory personnel, quality control, and
quality performances to ensure proficiency requirements for molecular
genetic testing. 124 This leaves fertility clinic labs in the self-regulating
position of assuring the accuracy and validity of their own tests.
31, 2008) ("The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) regulates all laboratory
testing (except research) performed on humans in the U.S. through the Clinical Laboratory
Improvement Amendments (CLIA) .... The objective of the CLIA program is to ensure

quality laboratory testing.").
121.
See Note, supra note 44, at 578; see also Adamson, supra note 49, at 737-38.
122.
See Note, supra note 44, at 578.
123.
See Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 263a
(2000); see also Adamson, supra note 49, at 728; Christopher D. Zalesky, Considering
Changes to CMS'S National Coverage Decision Process: Applying Lessons Learned from
FDA as a Regulator of Access to Healthcare Technology, 57 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 73, 78
(2002) ("Medicare was established by an act of Congress in 1965. The Health Care
Financing Administration (HCFA) (renamed CMS in 2001 by Secretary Thompson) was
established in 1977 and is located within DHHS. CMS is responsible for the administration
of Medicare and other programs." (footnotes omitted)).
124.
See Gail H. Javitt, In Search of a Coherent Framework: Options for FDA
Oversight of Genetic Tests, 62 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 617, 617 (2007) ("[T]he regulatory
environment for genetic testing has not evolved as quickly as has the technology itself.");
Id. at 624 ("Clinical laboratories, including those that use LDTs [(laboratory developed
tests)], are regulated under the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988,
but such oversight focuses on the quality of the laboratory's overall operations and does not
evaluate directly the safety and effectiveness of the individual tests performed. Moreover,
CLIA has not been fully implemented with respect to genetic testing laboratories, despite
the fact that CLIA was enacted to strengthen federal oversight of clinical laboratories and
to ensure the reliability of test results." (footnotes omitted)); Empire Medicare Services,
Part B NY News: National Government Services Top Claim Submission Errors,
http://www.empiremedicare.com/news/nynews07/ 062507ngs.htm (last visited Apr. 11,
2008) ("Congress passed the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments (CLIA) in
1988, establishing quality standards for all non-research laboratory testing performed on
specimens derived from humans for the purpose of providing information for the diagnosis,
prevention, treatment of disease, or impairment of, or assessment of health. CLIA requires
that laboratories performing these types of tests be certified by the Secretary of the
Department of Health & Human Services (DHHS)."); see e.g., Zalesky, supra note 123, at

670

VANDERBILTJ OFENTERTAINMENT AND TECH.LAW [Vol. 10:3:643

Of the three foregoing legislative enactments, the Fertility
Success Rate Act, 125 coupled with the FDA's enforcement powers,
provides the only available mechanism for possible meaningful
regulation. The Fertility Success Rate Act grew out of a perceived
need for a reporting system for consumers rather than a need for a
regulatory oversight mechanism.' 26 Congressman Ron Wyden, "[w]ith
the support and active participation of the American Society for
Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) and its affiliated society, the Society
for Assisted Reproductive Technology," developed and passed the
127
Fertility Success Rate Act, referred to as the Wyden Law.
As Dr. Adamson, chair of the National Committee Overseeing
ART and a board-certified reproductive endocrinologist, surgeon, and
director of Fertility Physicians of Northern California, said:
88 ("Congress enacted CLIA with an interest toward improving the quality of testing
performed by clinical laboratories. Under CLIA, DHHS implemented various provisions
relating to standards for quality control and determination of 'complexity' for certain
commercial in vitro diagnostic products sold for use by clinical laboratories. DHHS
delegated this responsibility to CMS. In turn, CMS and FDA agreed that FDA would
perform 'complexity categorizations' required under regulations promulgated by CMS to
implement CLIA. Under this agreement, FDA was simultaneously to review new
laboratory tests for section 510(k) premarket clearance under the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act and for complexity classification under CLIA." (footnotes omitted)); see also
Javitt, supra, at 639 ("In addition to the absence of premarket review, there is also little
postmarket oversight. While CLIA requires laboratories to be certified and inspected every
two years, it does not assess the clinical validity of the tests offered by clinical laboratories;
each laboratory director makes a decision about whether to offer a test. CMS officials in the
CLIA program have repeatedly asserted that CLIA does not permit oversight of clinical
validity. Even if the statute could be so construed, CMS's failure to implement regulations
to ensure the analytical validity of genetic tests makes it unlikely, as a practical matter,
that the agency would ever seek to regulate their clinical validity absent new legislation
requiring it to do so." (footnotes omitted)).
125.
Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C. §§ 263a-1

to -7 (2000).
126.
See Implementation of the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of
1992-A Model Program for the Certification of Embryo Laboratories, 64 Fed. Reg. 39,374
(July 21, 1999) ("The Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992 ... was
intended to provide the public with comparable information concerning the effectiveness of
infertility services and to assure the quality of such services by providing for the
certification of embryo laboratories."); see also Adamson, supra note 49, at 731 ("With the
support and active participation of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine
(ASRM) and its affiliated society, the Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology (SART),
[Congressman Ron Wyden] developed and passed the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and
Certification Act of 1992 ....
); Daar, supra note 41, at 254-55 ("Congress has enacted just
one law regulating the practice of reproductive medicine, the Fertility Clinic Success Rate
and Certification Act of 1992. The Act was born out of a concern that fertility clinics were
misleading prospective patients about pregnancy success rates in an era when reporting of
such data was completely voluntary ....
The goal of the Act's reporting provisions is to
provide consumers with reliable and accurate information about individual clinics'
pregnancy and 'take home baby' success rates." (footnotes omitted)).
127.
See Adamson, supra note 49, at 731.
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Overall, despite many difficulties in being the first "regulation" directly addressing
ART in the United States, the FCSRCA has been considered a success by
physicians, patients and the government. Implementation of the FCSRCA has
improved over time, helped with research by SART and others, helped improve the
clinical practice of ART, provided useful information
to patients, and been used by
128
the CDC for publication of papers regarding ART.

However, none of the ART-related statutes has the teeth of the
National Donor Act or the prohibitions against selling of the Uniform
29
Gift Transfer Act. 1
In the Congressional hearings prior to the passage of the
Fertility Success Rate Act, none of the discussions involved
commodification concerns related to the selling of reproductive
tissues. 130 These Congressional debates are in sharp contrast with the
testimony elicited around the passage of NOTA, where entire hearings
seemed to revolve around commodification in the face of market
forces. 13' This silence around the issue of selling and purchasing

128.
Id. at 732.
129.
Neither the Fertility Success Rate Act nor the FDA provides the strong
statutory authority or regulatory guidelines for prohibiting unethical conduct and
enforciging rules and regulations comparable to those provided in NOTA. See 42 U.S.C. §§
263a-1 to -7; Current Good Tissue Practice for Manufacturers of Human Cellular and
Tissue-Based Products; Inspection and Enforcement, 66 Fed. Reg. 1508, 1542-43 (proposed
Jan. 8, 2001) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1271); Establishment Registration and Listing for
Manufacturers of Human Cellular and Tissue-Based Products, 63 Fed. Reg. 26,744, 27,744
(proposed May 14, 1998) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 207, 807, and 1271); id. at 26,745 ("Even
today, FDA's human tissue regulations do not address the infectious disease risk of
donating, processing, and storing reproductive cells and tissue."); see, e.g., Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399a (2000); Lars Noah, Assisted Reproductive
Technologies and the Pitfalls of Unregulated BioMedical Innovation, 55 FLA. L. REV. 603,
648-49 (2003) ("Until recently, the FDA had not asserted regulatory jurisdiction over IVF
or other fertility procedures. Indeed, scholars who wrote about the regulation of ARTs had
paid no attention to the agency, and, when Congress passed the Fertility Clinic Success
Rate and Certification Act of 1992, it suggested no role for the FDA. Instead, it directed the
CDC to collect information and to develop a model program .... (footnotes omitted)); id. at
650 ("Nonetheless, in 1998, the FDA announced, and subsequently reiterated, that its
proposed rule governing cellular and tissue-based products would apply to ARTs as well...
."); id. at 651 ("More controversially, however, the FDA also asserted jurisdiction over other
aspects of ARTs, claiming that it had the authority to subject human reproductive tissues
to premarket review-and to demand proof of their safety and effectiveness-in the event
that they had undergone more than minimal manipulation.").
130.
See H.R. REP. No. 102-624 (1992); S. Rep. No. 102-452 (1992), as reprinted in
1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2564. In fact, the FCSRCA contains the following provision: "In
developing the certification program, the Secretary may not establish any regulation . ..
which has the effect of exercising supervision or control over the practice of medicine . . .
42 U.S.C. § 263a-2(i)(1).
131.
See Crepsi, supra note 10, at 15 n.75 ('The Senate Report on NOTA merely
stated: 'It is the sense of the Committee that individuals or organizations should not profit
by the sale of human organs for transplantation' and 'human body parts should not be
viewed as commodities.' The House Conference Report stated only that NOTA 'intends to
make the buying and selling of human organs unlawful .. " (citations omitted)).
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reproductive tissue is as loud as the debates on the prohibitions of
selling organs during those Congressional hearings.
G. PrivateActors and Regulators
Fertility clinics, drug suppliers (hormonal), gamete middlemen
(sperm banks, egg donor banks, and brokers), hospital fertility
centers, and private practitioners all operate in a dynamic market.
They provide services and goods to clientele seeking one ultimate goal:
132
the birth of a baby.
The ART market creates the rules under which it operates
without the need for excessive regulation. The fertility centers are
free to compete, offer experimental or advanced technology, and
arrange for the transfer or sale of reproductive material outside the
regulatory control of the United States government. In this sense,
they operate in the purest model of a free-market enterprise. The
clinics also participate in the fertility marketplace through their
membership in industry organizations. 133
These organizations
represent the interests of their members by acting as advocacy groups
and self-regulators, and, upon close examination, they appear to
operate as lobbying groups on behalf of their membership. 134 These
groups, with their collaborative arrangements with the medical
suppliers and pharmaceutical companies, are the dominant forces in
135
the ART marketplace.
132.
See SPAR, supra note 3, at 195-233 (discussing the global market for babies).
133.
See Adamson, supra note 49, at 735.
134.
See What Is SART?, supra note 68 ("SART serves as the governmental
watchdog for ART. Working in conjunction with the ASRM Public Affairs Office, members
of SART have worked diligently to protect our patients and the practice of ART from
inappropriate external intrusion and regulation. We have worked successfully to mitigate
many of the somewhat onerous requirements that had been initially proposed by the Food
and Drug Administration, including the need to quarantine all embryos derived from donor
eggs.").
135.
See Michael J. Malinowski, A Law-Policy Proposal To Know Where Babies Come
from During the Reproduction Revolution, 9 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 549, 550-53 (2006)
[hereinafter Malinowski, A Law-Policy Proposal] (citing the need for regulations due to the
experimental nature of ART, particularly in areas where experimentation and the practice
of medicine are so intertwined); see also Adamson, supra note 49, at 735 (discussing the
role SART and ASRM play in the market by actively lobbying for its members concerns);
Donna M. Gitter, Am I My Brother's Keeper? The Use of PreimplantationGenetic Diagnosis
To Create a Donor of Transplantable Stem Cells for an Older Sibling Suffering from a
Genetic Disorder, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 975, 986 n.54 (2005-2006) ("Commentators have
described the ASRM as 'the lead professional society issuing guidelines for reproductive
medicine."' (quoting Susan M. Wolf, Jeffrey P. Kahn & John E. Wagner, Using
Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis To Create a Stem Cell Donor: Issues, Guidelines &
Limits, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 327, 329 (2003)); Michael J. Malinowski, Choosing the
Genetic Makeup of Children: Our Eugenics Past-Present,and Future?, 36 CONN. L. REV.
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The American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) is the
primary professional, nonprofit organization for the advancement of
the art, science, and practice of reproductive medicine.
ASRM,
founded in 1944, is the leading market force in the field of
reproductive medicine. 136
ASRM and the Society for Assisted
Reproductive Technology (SART), a representative group, have
worked to develop and create the Reproductive Laboratory
Accreditation Program (RLAP).137
This program established
standards and performed on-site accreditation every two years for
embryo laboratories. 138 Two-thirds of SART programs are accredited
125, 179-80 (2003) [hereinafter Malinowski, Choosing the Genetic Makeup of Children]
("George Annas, a noted bioethicist and law professor at the Boston University School of
Public Health who serves on the Ethics Advisory Board of the Society for Assisted
Reproductive Technology ('SART') and the American Society for Reproductive Medicine
('ASRM'), refers to assisted reproduction as 'the wild West' of American medicine. ART is
poised at the intersection of a highly vulnerable and growing patient group willing to pay
directly and expend considerable personal wealth for these services, and a sophisticated,
highly competitive commercial sector engaged in aggressive DTC marketing. ART also
provides an opportunity for medical professionals to enjoy professional autonomy and reap
significant financial returns at a time when physician income and discretion are generally
being checked by managed care." (footnotes omitted)); id. at 175 ("The alliance-based
nature of biotechnology R&D, reflected in the extraordinary integration of biotechnology
and pharmaceutical companies, and industry and academia through entanglements of
alliance and collaboration agreements, has contributed to the pace of collective
advancement in the field of biotechnology and its progeny fields .... ");Ouellette et al.,
supra note 55 (discussing ASRM and SART members and the collaborative working
relationship they have with the CDC, an agency required to regulate the data reporting
from the fertility clinics).
136.
See American Society for Reproductive Medicine: History and Purpose,
http://www.asrm.org/history.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2008).
137.
See Ouellette et al., supra note 55, at 424-25 ("From 1992 to 2004, the
responsibility for data collection rested largely on [SART], a private organization of ART
clinical programs and an affiliate of the [ASRM.... In 2004, the CDC announced a change
in its data collection contractor and in approved data reporting systems for 2004-2008.");
What Is Sart?, supra note 68 ('SART has also worked in conjunction with the Centers for
Disease Control, collecting and validating outcome data and requiring accreditation of
embryology laboratories.").
138.
See Adamson, supra note 49, at 732-33 ("SART and ASRM worked with the
College of American Pathologists (CAP) to create the Reproductive Laboratory
Accreditation Program in 1992. This program stated requirements and performed onsite
accreditation every two years for embryo laboratories. Currently two-thirds of SART
programs are accredited through this CAP/SART/ASRM program. The other one-third are
accredited through New York State or through the Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO)."); Malinowski, A Law-Policy Proposal,supra note 135,
at 551-52 ("The CDC has contractually outsourced implementation of its responsibilities
under the FCSRCA to the Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology (SART) and the
American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM)."); Ouellette et al., supra note 55, at
424 ("From 1992 to 2004, the responsibility for data collection rested largely on the Society
for Assisted Reproductive Technology (SART), a private organization of ART clinical
programs and an affiliate of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM).
SART has been keeping an ART success rate database since 1986." (footnotes omitted)); id.
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through this program.
SART works closely with the FDA in
developing regulations and conducts compliance visits in conjunction
with the FDA. 139 This close working relationship creates a question of
suspect federal oversight. When coupled with the lack of public
debate over ART regulation, the nonexistent federal regulatory
framework in the fertility marketplace has to be examined in light of a
"capture" hypothesis-where the administrative agency becomes
"captive" to regulated entities rather than regulating in the best
interests of the public.

at 425 ("SART requires its members to submit and verify annual ART success rate data
and their other membership requirements. SART members must receive inspection and
accreditation by an outside agency every two years, and must meet all SART/ASRM ethical
practice, laboratory and advertising guidelines ....
Regardless of whether they are SART
members or not, federal law requires all ART clinics to report and verify ART success rate
data annually." (footnote omitted)).
139.
See Adamson, supra note 49, at 733 ("SART has also worked extensively with
the FDA developing their recently enacted regulations."). Adamson, a board certified
reproductive endocrinologist and Chair of the National Committee overseeing ART, states:
In addition to these activities with its members, both SART and ASRM have
continued to cooperate with and lead initiatives with other organizations and
institutions that are stakeholders in ART. These include the CDC, FDA, NIH,
FTC, and members of Congress as well as professional organizations such as the
American Medical Association (AMA), American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists (ACOG), the American Bar Association (ABA) and consumer
organizations, RESOLVE, the National Fertility Organization, and the American
Fertility Association (AFA).
A significant initiative by SART was the development of the National Coalition
for Oversight of the Assisted Reproductive Technologies (NCOART). This group
started as a subcommittee of SART in 1996 with the mission of bringing together
stakeholders in ART to serve as an inter-disciplinary body overseeing the
provision of assisted reproductive technology services in the United States....
Members in NCOART's twice-yearly meetings are SART (co-chair), RESOLVE
(co-chair), ASRM, CDC, FDA and FTC. . . . Although carrying no regulatory
authority, NCOART has been an effective forum for the stakeholders in ART.
Id. at 735; see What Is SART?, supra note 68 ("The current FDA regulations do represent a
work in progress, and SART and its members continue to interact constantly with
appropriate officers of the FDA in an effort to make this process more efficient. We play a
significant role in interacting with members of Congress and their staff regarding pending
legislation which may have a direct impact on our practice. SART keeps its members
apprised of relevant publications in the Federal Register through informational alerts via
both fax and e-mail. Another organization, the National Coalition for Oversight of Assisted
Reproductive Technology (NCOART) was organized by SART and meets on a scheduled
basis in an effort to bring together representatives from SART, ASRM, the FDA, CDC,
RESOLVE, AFA, the American Association of Tissue Banks, the American Bar Association,
and others to discuss mutual issues or concerns. In this way, SART has been able to
network effectively in a small-group setting with leaders of consumer groups, professional
organizations, and government agencies to exchange ideas and share information and
concerns on an ongoing basis."); see also Ouellette et al., supra note 55, at 424 ("Although
the CDC took over publishing ART success rate reports in 1995, SART remained the
driving force behind the CDC's publications." (internal footnote omitted)).
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SART's Web site indicates that members include corporations
such as Bayer, Merck, Wyeth, Lilly, Brown & Brown Insurance,
Columbia Laboratories, Ferring Pharmaceuticals, Ortho Women's
Health, Cook Medical, Dowden Health Media, DuraMed, Solvay
Pharmaceuticals, and Edm-Serono-Inc. 140 This partial list includes
sponsors who not only provide the hormonal drugs, products, and
devices to fertility clinics, but who also participate in policy-making
decisions of SART-a purported "self-regulating" entity.141
SART represents, by its own admission, eighty-five percent of
clinics practicing ART. 14 2 Members of SART are required to comply
with ASRM and SART guidelines. 143 Failure to do so results in
removal from membership in the organization, but no further
sanctions are imposed. 144 SART is also extensively involved in data
collection, practice guidelines and standards, government interaction,
quality assurance, and research. The National Coalition for Oversight
of Assisted Reproduction Technology (an outgrowth of these two
groups) "brings together representatives from various government
agencies and professional, legal, and consumer groups to discuss
145
mutual issues."
Compliance with reporting requirements is determined
through on-site validation visits. "These validations are conducted in
conjunction with CDC to determine whether the clinic has accurately
reported the data required for the yearly report to the CDC." 146 This
self-regulation regime allows for experimentation and research within
the clinic, but also fails to prevent a non-reporting clinic from
operating. Therefore, violators can continue providing services to
patients.

See SART, http://www.sart.org/index.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2008); see also
140.
American Society for Reproductive Medicine: 2007 Corporate Member Council,
http://www.asrm.org/ Professionals/Membership/cmc.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2008).
American Society for Reproductive Medicine: 2007 Corporate Member Council,
141.
supra note 140 (This information was originally on SART's Web site.).
What Is SART?, supra note 68 ("Our organization includes over 392 member
142.
practices, representing over 85% of the ART clinics in our country."); see Moses, supra note
15, at 543 ("SART describes itself as 'the premier organization of professionals dedicated to
the practice of ARTs in the United States."' (citation omitted)).
See Moses, supra note 15, at 544.
143.
See id.
144.
Id.; see also Adamson, supra note 49, at 735.
145.
See Adamson, supra note 49, at 732 ("However, the CDC is not a regulatory
146.
body and does not have the authority to sanction nonreporters other than to report them as
such. The results that are reported are validated randomly by annually selecting
approximately 10% of the reporting clinics for onsite visits, and by review of the charts and
telephone calls to patients to confirm birth outcomes of ART treatment.").
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Most fertility clinics are members of SART, 147 as can be seen
from its corporate subscribers list, which is closely aligned with the
pharmaceutical and biological products industry.
Although this
alignment may not be unethical or harmful, groups like SART
certainly cannot provide for sufficiently objective review of these
clinics in light of their corporate relations.
H. The Marketplace
In the fertility market, 148 the interplay between powerful,
dominant participants and the economics of the law of supply and
demand supports the conclusion that private enterprises avoided
regulation based on (1) capture of administrative agencies by the
dominant market players, 149 coupled with (2) the failure of society to
address the ethical concerns of private research in ART. This failure
occurred during the 1980s, when the politics of abortion and
embryonic research effectively silenced the debate over assisted
reproductive technology for infertility purposes, eliminated federal
funding and oversight of embryonic research, and allowed the private
150
infertility marketplace to develop.
For our purposes, dominance is defined as an attribute used to
identify those entities whose presence through the purchase or sale of
a good affects the supply and demand of a particular resource within a
market through access to capital, infrastructure, technology, or

147.
What Is SART?, supra note 68.
148.
See Mahoney, supra note 17, at 204 ("The use of the term 'market' can cause
misunderstandings similar to those engendered by the phrase 'property rights.' As the
twentieth century draws to a close, confidence in the free enterprise system runs high, but
enthusiasm for private ordering is tempered by support for the regulation of markets in
many goods and services. To state that a market exists in a particular good should not be
taken as an assertion that there is-or should be-a free-for-all of unregulated bargains.
'Market' simply denotes transfers for consideration, with buyers and sellers engaging in
mutually beneficial exchanges. Many markets are, of course, heavily regulated, with the
terms and conditions of permissible bargains between ready and willing participants
curtailed. The prevalence of these regulated markets illustrates that the choice is not
between a completely unrestricted exchange system on the one hand and a total absence of
commercial activity in human tissue on the other." (footnotes omitted)).
149.
See Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Equity: An Analysis of Exceptions to
Administrative Rules, 1982 DUKE L.J. 277, 326-27 ("The capture doctrine posits [that] an
agency [can be] ultimately dominated by the industry it sets out to regulate. The
beneficiaries of the regulation-consumers, for example-are short-changed because the
agency eventually puts the interests of the regulated ahead of the interests of those whom
the agency was established to protect." (footnote omitted)).
150.
See generally SPAR, supranote 3; Eggen, supra note 20.
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skill. 15 1 Dominant participants derive a benefit from either the supply
side or the demand side of the market. Dominant market participants
in the fertility marketplace include the medical providers,
pharmaceutical and technological suppliers, and the infertile
Egg donors serve as the living resource for the
customers.
marketplace. Much like the owners of cattle or livestock, the egg
donors are paid for the care and husbandry of their tissue resources.
In a free market, 152 the dynamics of supply and demand are
resolved through the price mechanism. Everything has a price and
buyers (demand side) obviously want the price to be lower, while
sellers (supply side) want the price to be higher.1 53 Changes in
demand are affected by personal preferences, population shifts, prices
of substitute goods and services, incomes, and forecasts of future
prices. Changes in supply can occur because of changes in production
capacity, technology, cost structure, prices of substitutes, and
154
forecasts of future prices.
Shifts in supply and demand usually occur over lengthy periods
of time. Recent shifts in population, delayed child bearing, for
example, and the effect on infertility rates have all contributed to
increased demand for fertility services. Shifts in supply can occur
because of the advancement in technology, the increasing speed in
which technologies are applied, and the effectiveness of technology
transfer. 155 During the past decade, the fertility market underwent a

See Robert D. Cooter, The Best Right Laws: Value Foundationsof the Economic
151.
Analysis of Law, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 817 (1989) (describing the relationship between
efficiency and other values underlying laws, and utilitarian functions within the
framework of legal analysis). Cooter posits that "the criterion of Pareto efficiency is
concerned with satisfying people's preferences." Id. at 824. He moves from a discussion of
individualistic standards of values that satisfy the preference of individuals to a discussion
of "[tihe social atomism of economics, which is 'self-evident' in the study of competitive
markets, [and] extends to law and policy." Id. The most relevant point is his discussion of
externalities. He argues that the extension of this analysis to externalities shows that "the
model of perfect competition breaks down when utilities cannot be separated." Id. at 826.
152.

See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (Aldine Press 1970); see also Alan

Devlin, Note, A Proposed Solution to the Problem of Parallel Pricing in Oligopolistic
Markets, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1116 (2007) ("Under perfect competition, every producer is
a price taker; that is, each firm faces a horizontal demand curve and therefore cannot
influence the price at which its good is sold by unilaterally reducing its output. Accordingly,
marginal revenue always equals price." (footnote omitted)).
153.
154.

See WALTER J. WESSELS, ECONOMICS 41-47 (3d ed. 2000).
MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 4 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1962).

155.
See SPAR, supra note 3, at 15 (citing the effect of delayed childbearing on
fertility for the modern woman). "[Flemale fertility peaks at around age twenty-seven and
An average twenty-eight-year-old woman,
then declines dramatically after thirty-five ....
for example, has a 72 percent chance of conceiving after a year of effort. An average thirtyeight-year-old, by contrast, has only a 24 percent chance." Id.; see also WESSELS, supra note
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rapid change in the amount of technology available in assisted
reproduction. 156 Although it is not immediately clear that this change
actually lowered infertility rates, this technology change did help to
fuel the increase in demand for services by increasing access to
infertility treatment. 157
When the economy has a fixed amount of resources and the
economy is using those resources efficiently, society can reap the
optimal benefit from marketplace dynamics. Markets, however, can
be inefficient as a result of misallocations of scarce resources. 158 In the
market for infertility treatment, inefficiencies are often the direct
result of decisions made by consumers and producers (e.g., delayed
59
childbearing, artificial supply costs, and monopolies of suppliers).1
Some economists argue that such decisions necessitate the availability
of crucial information in order to ensure consumers are wellinformed.160 Consumers in the fertility marketplace need to know

153, at 52-53 (asserting an economic maxim that technological advances can shift the
supply curve).
156.
See generally SPAR, supra note 3.
157.
See Moses, supra note 15, at 514 (presenting IVF as an example of "how a
technology makes possible many new forms of conduct").
158.

See MICHAEL ALLINGHAM, CHOICE THEORY: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 3

(2002) ('The origin of... choice is desire and reasoning with a view to an end-this is why
choice cannot exist without . . . reason'; or more concisely, 'choice is deliberate desire."'
(quoting Aristotle)). Allingham explains choice theory as an exploration of what it means to
be rational and, possibly, as a guide to making sensible decisions. Id. at 9; see also
WESSELS, supra note 153, at 3. But see SMITH, supra note 152, at 398. Smith viewed
competition as economically efficient and saw an "invisible hand" moving in the choices
individuals made, which collectively worked to the greater good:
Every individual is continually exerting himself to find out the most
advantageous employment for whatever capital he can command. It is his own
advantage, indeed, and not that of the society, which he has in view. But the
study of his own advantage naturally, or rather necessarily, leads him to prefer
that employment which is the most advantageous to the society.
Id.
159.
See generally SPAR, supra note 3; Moses, supra note 15, at 512 ("The
introduction of IVF and the development of related techniques are examples of
technological change."); id. at 508 ("Few technologies arrive unannounced and few remain
unchanged over time. Technologies are not unaffected by the shift from new invention to
widely used phenomenon. The development of techniques to facilitate the fertilization of
human eggs or ova is no exception.").
160.
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 154, at 4 ("[It] is the role of competitive capitalismthe organization of the bulk of economic activity through private enterprise operating in a
free market-as a system of economic freedom and a necessary condition for political
freedom."); id. at 12-13 ('The basic problem of social organization is how to co-ordinate the
economic activities of large numbers of people .... Fundamentally, there are only two ways
of co-ordinating the economic activities of millions. One is .. . the use of coercion ....

The

other is voluntary co-operation of individuals-the technique of the market place. The
possibility of co-ordination through voluntary co-operation rests on the elementary-yet
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about success rates, but they also need to know what applications are
safe. They need to be informed of the possible hazards of any
contemplated medical procedure. Ultimately, consumers and society
need to be informed about the costs of any medical intervention.
Information relating to the cost of externalities, which has an impact
on supply and demand, needs to be available to both consumers and
161
society in general.
In the fertility market there is an imperfect amount of
information available to the consumer.
The marketplace is
unregulated and operates without scrutiny from the usual regulatory
oversight of enterprises that affect the health of citizens. It is almost
impossible to discern whether the prices paid and the costs of the
technology are beneficial or detrimental to society. Factor in the
commodification issue(s) on the selling of eggs and the market has a
serious downside: the true costs of the ART laissez-faire system
remain unknown.
In an efficient market, market dynamics move the price and
quantity of goods to a consistent equilibrium. At that point, producers
are supplying the quantity that consumers are demanding. The free

frequently denied-proposition that both parties to an economic transaction benefit from it,
provided the transactionis bi-laterally voluntary and informed.").
161.
See WESSELS, supra note 153, at 493-94; see also Michele Goodwin, Assisted
Reproductive Technology and the Double Bind: The Illusory Choice of Motherhood, 9 J.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 1, 16 (2005) ("[Is that a real option when the results are that 65% of
the women who undergo ART do not get pregnant? Only 34% of ART efforts result in
clinical pregnancies, and the majority of patients will suffer miscarriages, abort, or simply
will not conceive. ART patients who become pregnant suffer a higher incidence of
miscarriages, Cesarean births, and fetal birth defects." (footnotes omitted)). Goodwin, in
hypothesizing whether the assisted reproductive technology is really a boon for our society,
argues that decisions made utilizing a technology without adequate information on the
benefits and the risks actually do not provide the consumer with a meaningful choice or
viable options. She questions whether using ART is a viable option for the infertile
consumer when the success rates of a pregnancy are not well known and often are not that
favorable. Id.; see Alvar6, supra note 2, at 61 ("First, at the very least, the time has come to
fund studies about the long term effects-physical, emotional, social-of collaborative
reproduction on children."). Alvar6 argues for the protection of the children born of
collaborative reproduction and contends that legislators should act to prevent the physical
risk ART poses to children, whether the risk occurs at the embryonic or fetal stage. "Before
any particular ART process 'goes commercial,' it should be more carefully scrutinized, and
more animal testing should be conducted." Id. Finally, Alvar6 explores the need for more
information prior to the utilization of ART selections and the impact of these selections on
society.
This approach also necessitates the hard work of deciding the kinds of knowledge
that should be available to intending parents, as well as the social implications of
those categories of knowledge included. Should we include race? Health and
disabilities? Education and employment? All of these categories are fraught with
controversy.
Id. at 62.
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marketplace is touted as indispensable to the achievement of political
freedom. Consumers, though, are not often overly concerned with
these "freedom" issues when demanding a good for their own use; the
infertile consumer is concerned primarily with her ability to conceive a
Issues of commodification are not
child at an affordable cost.
subjected to widespread public debate or discourse in the fertility
industry. Rather, consumers and producers are subject to market
forces relating to the demand and supply of viable eggs and sperm for
reproduction.
Markets cater to those who have the money to spend. "Even in
this era of enthusiasm for free markets, controversy rages over the
appropriate boundaries of the free enterprise system-what should be
162
for sale and what should be kept out of the domain of the market?"'
The price system gives an incentive to produce only the things that
people are willing to pay for, and therefore, under a price system,
resources are directed toward producing things for those who have
money to spend. Within this framework, Professor Margaret Radin
argues against commodification, not only of human body parts but also
of eggs and sperm. 163 She refers to the entire placement or use of
market rhetoric as commodification. 164 She argues that this market
rhetoric for the sale of human reproductive tissue devalues not only
165
the market users but society.

162.
Mahoney, supra note 17, at 164.
Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1857
163.
(1987) ("[T]he question [about commodification] asks about the appropriate relationship of
particular things to the market, normative theories about the appropriate social role of the
market should be helpful in trying to answer it."); see id. at 1937 ("To the extent that we
must not assimilate our conception of personhood to the market, market-inalienabilities
are justified."); id. at 1907 ("In my discussion of possible sources of dissatisfaction with
thinking of rape in market terms, I suggested that we should not view personal things as
fungible commodities. We are now in a better position to understand how conceiving of
personal things as commodities does violence to personhood, and to explore the problem of
knowing what things are personal." (footnote omitted)). Radin lists surrogacy and babyselling as part of the contested reproductive commodification issues. Id. at 1852, 1856.
Id. at 1855 ('Market-inalienability often expresses an aspiration for
164.
noncommodification. By making something nonsalable we proclaim that it should not be
conceived of or treated as a commodity. When something is noncommodifiable, market
trading is a disallowed form of social organization and allocation. We place that thing
beyond supply and demand pricing, brokerage and arbitrage, advertising and marketing,
stockpiling, speculation, and valuation in terms of the opportunity cost of production."
(footnote omitted)); id. at 1850 ("Something that is market-inalienable is not to be sold,
which in our economic system means it is not to be traded in the market.").
Id. at 1917 ('Yet, taking a slightly longer view, commodification threatens the
165.
personhood of everyone, not just those who can now afford to concern themselves about
it.").
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A related problem with markets involves income and wealth
inequity. A review of the self-regulating entities representing the
suppliers (ASRM and SART) supports the proposition that there are
substantial benefits available for the suppliers of technology and
applications in the infertility marketplace.
The immediate problem with the current ART marketplace is
that the social costs are largely invisible. We do not have sufficiently
accurate information about ART and its effect on the children
produced, the women involved in the selling of eggs, the gene pool, or
the ethical implications of research lacking the benefits of public
discourse. Without regulatory oversight, private parties have not
chosen to publish statistical data or information addressing
commodification issues, and therefore, numerous questions relating to
the market remain unanswered. Does the alienability of human eggs
reflect a moral position or a purely economical market stance?
In the United States, the fertility marketplace is currently
operating without comprehensive governmental regulation or an
extensive reporting system. It is unclear whether this market is truly
efficient, or if hidden external costs exist.
I. Capture by Dominant Market Forces
Administrative agencies may be subject to "capture" by the
very forces they are designed to regulate. The dominant market forces
in ART include the fertility clinics, the physicians, the pharmaceutical
companies, the suppliers, the representative organizations, the
embryo laboratories, the gamete middlemen and brokers, and the
infertile consumer.
In the fertility industry, the governmental
agencies receive very little input from Congress as to how to
regulate. 166 Regulatory agencies (e.g., the FDA, CDC, and DHHS) are

166.

See SPAR, supra note 3, at 51 ("In the fertility trade ...

private rules reign. The

fertility centers themselves set the rules that guide their conduct, working under the
auspices of the ASRM .

. .

. In the United States, at least, the federal government is

essentially silent, offering only the merest of parameters: fertility centers must report their
success rates to the Centers for Disease Control; they must abide by basic laws forbidding
malpractice and fraud ....

Outside these boundaries, the centers are free to operate and

compete."). Spar opines: "In most parts of the world, such oversight [national oversight] is
already in place. In the United States, by contrast, federal regulation is minimal, confined
to a single piece of legislation (the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of
1992) without any means of enforcement." Id. at 34; see also Moses, supra note 15, at 542
("The absence of formal government regulation does not mean that IVF is necessarily the
Wild West of medicine. Various professional groups have imposed extra-legal standards
relating to professional qualifications and the manner in which procedures ought to be
carried out, as well as opinions on what is and is not acceptable.").
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free to develop close and collaborative relationships with the market
stakeholders.
The capture hypothesis postulates that the regulatory agencies tend to be
"captured" by the industry they regulate and act in the industry's behalf rather

than the consumers'....
Often, when a regulatory agency is "captured" a price ceiling becomes a price floor
forced upon consumers ....

167

The traditional model of agency behavior identified agencies as
apolitical and viewed them as mere tools for implementing the
legislative directives of Congress. 168 A revised pluralist model of
agency behavior described agencies as "mini-legislatures," weighing
the desires of various interest groups equally. 169 The capture theory
underscores the proposition that the industries being regulated could
actually become the controlling factors in administrative decisionmaking.170
Scholars argue that capture theory requires at least three
entities: an agency, a Congressional committee or group that oversees
the agency, and a dominant interest group. 17' "In order to secure
favorable regulations, the interest group (so the story goes) will
aggressively lobby committee members and provide support, financial
or otherwise, for the members' reelection efforts. Those committee
members will then pressure the agencies to enact favorable
regulations."'172 Ostensibly, "the rest of Congress will be largely
oblivious to the activities of that committee and the agency, [and] this
'iron triangle' will inevitably cater to the interest groups' narrow
desires to the detriment of the public interest."' 73 Well-organized
groups can exert a disproportionate influence over the regulatory
process, partly because of their political capital and organizing
capacities, and also because of the agencies' ultimate dependence on

WESSELS, supra note 153, at 428.
167.
168.
Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1669 (1975) ("The traditional model of American administrative law
has been centrally concerned with restricting administrative actions to those authorized by
legislative directives. Professor Stewart traces the development and disintegration of the
); id. at 1673 ("The requirement that agencies conform to specific
traditional model ....
legislative directives not only legitimates administrative action by reference to higher

authority, but also curbs officials' exploitation of the governmental apparatus to give vent
to private prejudice or passion.").
169.
See Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the
Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1284 (2006).
See id.; see also WESSELS, supra note 153, at 428.
170.
Bagley & Revesz, supra note 169, at 1284.
171.

172.
173.

Id.
Id.
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good relations with them and on the information that only they can
174
provide.
The traditional view of "capture" creates the specter of the
"complicity of congressional committees." 175 It also supposes that
congressional committees are composed of persons who exert influence
over the agency for the benefit of powerful industry entities. 176 In
time, the committee exerts influence over the agency's values, moving
them away from the values of the elected officials and the concerns of
77
the voters who pushed for a regulatory scheme.
The next generation of capture theorists posited another
theory, sometimes called "interest group domination," which "argued
that regulatory capture was a pervasive pathology of the
administrative state" and sought to invoke a public choice capture
theory.178 The explanations for this supposed pathology centered on
how agencies worked with various interest groups to obtain
information, political support, and guidance. 179 The more closely the
agency worked with the groups for information, the more likely,
theorists maintained, that capture would occur.180
As two scholars argued, "'narrow, well-organized groups' will,
on the whole, 'capture' agencies in order to pressure them to enact
excessive regulation."'' 8 1 However, this viewpoint has been refuted by
174.
See id. at 1285 ('Well-organized and tightly knit constituencies will inevitably
have an organizational advantage over a dispersed public when it comes to providing 'the
two things that a political party needs: votes and resources.' The political branches will

therefore be more attuned to the interest of those narrow interest groups than to the
desires of the general public. It follows that, 'as a rule, regulation is acquired by the
industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit."' (footnotes omitted)); David
Dana & Susan P. Koniak, Bargainingin the Shadow of Democracy,,148 U. PA. L. REV. 473,
497 ("According to 'capture' or 'public choice' political theorists, however, government
regulation does not work this way in practice. Instead, well-organized interest groupsmost notably the targets of prospective regulation-often work to secure provisions in
regulatory statutes that leave key decisions in the hands of agency regulators. The interest
groups then exploit their power with key legislators to secure case-by-case legislative
interventions in agency decision making." (footnote omitted)).
175.
See Bagley & Revesz, supra note 169, at 1284-85; David B. Spence, The Shadow
of the Rational Polluter: Rethinking the Role of Rational Actor Models in Environmental
Law, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 917, 927 n.29 (2001).
176.
Bagley & Revesz, supra note 169, at 1285.
177.
Id.
178.
Id. at 1285.
179.
Id.
180.
Id.
181.
See id. at 1286 ("This view takes as its core assumption that 'narrow, wellorganized groups' will, on the whole, 'capture' agencies in order to pressure them to enact
excessive regulation. The villains of this story are environmental groups like the Sierra
Club, labor unions like the Teamsters, and consumer advocacy groups like Public Citizen,
all of whom are driven by their narrow ideologies and heedless of any costs to American
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both scholars and empirical data alike.
"A 1977 Senate Report
concluded that regulated industries far outspent public interest
groups in lobbying agency decisionmakers, with regulated industries
sometimes lavishing anywhere between fifty and one hundred times
as much as their public interest counterparts."' 18 2 The reality of an
agency being captured by "pro-regulatory" public interest groups,
resulting in the creation and implementation of a multiplicity of over83
regulation because of capture, simply has not occurred.
Industry groups with the most at stake are more likely to
organize because each individual member will have more at stake in
avoiding overzealous regulation. Thus, public choice theory asserts
that "smaller, better-organized, and better-financed industry groups"
will be more successful at achieving group goals in Congress than
184
larger "public interest" groups.

Currently, agencies, more frequently than not, utilize "the
judgment of private firms they regulate" in order to achieve broad
public goals.' 8 5 The capture theory, as it has emerged and as it has
been used to support the deregulation frenzy of the administrative
18 6
agencies of the Reagan era, ignored the true realities of agencies.
The agencies were actually more susceptible to being captured by the
industry or groups targeted for regulation than by their public interest
8 7
counterparts.
industries. Through their superior organizational mettle, these ostensibly 'public-serving'
groups prey on the sensibilities of warm-hearted but fuzzy-headed bureaucrats and
congressmen to drive through regulations that are unnecessary, unwise, or simply too
costly." (footnotes omitted)).
182.
Id. at 1288. "Public choice theory, then, suggests that the large 'proregulatory'
interest groups against which DeMuth and Ginsburg rail will be consistently outgunned in
the legislative and regulatory process by smaller, better-organized, and better-financed
industry groups." Id. at 1287.
183.
See id. at 1284 ("[T]heories of agency overregulation often rest on faulty
premises and are in any event no more plausible than alternative theories suggesting that
agencies will routinely underregulate").
184.
Id. at 1287.
185.
See Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms,
Decisionmaking,and Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 DUKE L.J. 377 (2006).
186.
See Bagley & Revesz, supra note 169, at 1262.
187.
See David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the
Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97, 114 (2000) (describing a variant on the public choice
theory of "capture," which "implicate[s] both values and information as determinants of
preferences"). Spence and Cross suggest that the "capture theory focuses on information,
suggesting that industry captures an agency by virtue of the pervasive presence of industry
and industry information in agency policymaking proceedings over the long term." Id. This
capture theory is largely based on the premise that "the general public eventually loses
interest in agency policymaking, leaving only regulated interest groups to participate in
the process," which results in the agency adopting the policy preferences of that interest
group. Id. at 105 n.37.
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The capture theory has long had its critics. Specifically, critics
argued that the theory was overly simplified and failed to take into
account true behavioral economics. Today, proponents of the public
choice capture theory would be hard pressed to describe it "as a valid
descriptive theory of bureaucratic behavior."' 8 8 Public choice theory
today could actually support a finding of an alternate reality for
agency capture. "[W]ell-organized industry groups that stand to gain
from a reduction in burdensome regulations will normally provoke an
89
antiregulatoryresponse from the administrative state."'
The driving concern behind the public choice/agency capture
theories remains viable.
The concern is that when government
officials are given substantial authority over a public issue to make
and enforce policy decisions, and the agency group is insulated from
the impact of a voting electorate, that agency group may be subjected
to extensive pressure from groups that have a particularly strong
interest in the consequences of its policy decisions. 190 The lack of
regulation by the government of the fertility industry may be a result
of both a capture syndrome leading to domination by the ART
providers and suppliers, and a failure of the society to address the
difficult and complicated issues raised by the new technologies. There
are multiple competing and collaborating interests at play in the
assisted reproductive technology marketplace.
In the ART marketplace there is scant regulatory control over
the provision of services to the public. The medical providers, through
their associative organizations (e.g., ARSM and SART), proclaim their
affinity for the non-regulatory state of affairs on their Web sites. 19'
The medical providers also advertise their associative arrangements
with the providers of relevant pharmaceuticals and medical
technology.1 92 Based on the dominant positions of the stakeholders, it
188.
Id. at 121-22; see also Bagley & Revesz, supra note 169, at 1288-89 ("A litany of
studies all support the conclusion that 'regulated parties enjoy much greater presence in
agency decisionmaking than do public interest groups and other outside parties.' Taken
together, these studies provide overwhelming empirical support for our theoretical
conclusion that if any group has disproportionate access to the administrative state, it is
industry." (footnote omitted)).
189.
Bagley & Revesz, supra note 169, at 1286.
190.
See Mark C. Niles, On the Hijacking of Agencies (and Airplanes): The Federal
Aviation Administration, 'Agency Capture,"andAirline Security, 10 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL'Y & L. 381, 390 (2002) (describing capture as occurring "when a regulated entity-like
a large corporation, or more likely an association of corporate interests-succeed, through
lobbying or other influential devices, in replacing what would otherwise be the public-policy
agenda of the agency with its own private and self-serving agenda").
191.
See SART, supra note 140.
192.
See id. The medical providers are the members of SART and ASRM, the
reproductive fertility specialists. The SART Web site contains the names of some of their
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is patently clear that strong regulatory control through agency
oversight has been usurped by the market participants. The close
collaborative working relationships between the agencies and the
medical providers in clinical reporting and reviews underscore the
influence of the medical providers.
Administrative agencies frequently utilize the judgment of
private firms under their regulatory control to achieve public goals
and agency legislative mandates.
Such regulation can include
identifying and reducing risks derived from the storage of financial
data and reducing risks related to homeland security. 193 Broad public
policy goals with complex and complicated methods of production are
increasingly implemented with wide discretionary outcomes and
deference to private firms as to how to interpret and achieve those
goals.194
Such discretion may appear well-suited for complicated societal
goals where specific rules often cannot reflect the large number of
variables involved in achieving multi-faceted regulatory goals.
Allowing private firms such discretion and opportunity to interpret
compliance control may be efficient. As one scholar of administrative
law stated: "Traditional regulation seeks to achieve particular
outcomes by articulating, ex ante, universal rules requiring certain
conduct or particular technology.
Such command-and-control
regulation conveys little discretion to regulated parties in
implementation; they can either comply with the regulatory
requirements, or fail to do so."195 However, there are drawbacks to
this type of regulation. "This type of regulation proves less operative
when regulatory goals are more complex. Specific rules often cannot
reflect the large number of variables involved in achieving
multifaceted regulatory goals, such as reducing the types of risk
196
produced by a combination of factors."'
The ART marketplace is lightly regulated with a close
collaborative relationship between the federal regulatory agencies and
the dominant industry groups.
The issues involved in the
reproductive technology field are multi-faceted.
The questions
swirling around the technology, the resources, the ethical
implications, and the costs are complicated and lack easy solutions.
pharmaceutical providers. I am referring to the 'clinics' and fertility experts who are
members of SART as the medical providers for the infertile customer seeking to have a
baby.
193.
See Bamberger, supra note 185, at 377.
194.
See id.
195.
Id. at 386.
196.
Id. at 386-87.
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The alignment of the federal regulatory agencies and the dominant
ART players may well have its origin in the complexities of the
technology and the need for information exchange, particularly when,
initially, the political climate had all but eliminated federal oversight
and participation in the reproductive research area. The current lack
of regulatory control in the ART marketplace seems highly unusual
today in light of emergent technologies.
Economists, on the other hand, like to assert that the ordinary
individual makes her selections based on a set of rational selfmotivating interests. 197
The rational purchaser of eggs will be
motivated by her self-interest in a successful outcome. The rational
private market supplier of ART will be motivated by its self-interest in
generating a profit and in sustaining the marketplace. 198 Thus, it
would be logical to assume that the private, dominant market
suppliers in ART would be motivated by their self-interest to influence
agencies to regulate for the suppliers' benefit. Or, at least, they would
arguably push the agencies to avoid "over-regulation" to enhance their
market interests.
The current lack of regulation posits more questions for society.
If we assume that a specific technological application has a benefit to
society, then collectively, as rational decision-makers, we should seek
the maximum benefit (Mb) of any application of this specific
technological advance.
To attain Mb from the purchase of the
application, the infertile consumer wants to achieve a successful
outcome at a price she can afford.

197.
See Terry L. Anderson, Markets and the Environment: Friends or Foes?, 55
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 81, 81 (2004) ("From this analysis follows one of the main tenets of
economics: if the marginal benefits are greater than the marginal cost, do it.").
198.
See Kathleen Bawn, Choosing Strategies To Control the Bureaucracy: Statutory
Constraints, Oversight, and the Committee System, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 101 (1997)
(discussing marginal benefits and costs of agency action); Steve P. Calandrillo, Responsible
Regulation: A Sensible Cost-Benefit, Risk Versus Risk Approach to Federal Health and
Safety Regulation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 957, 980-81 (2001) ("Economics scholars have devised
several tools in the attempt to measure economic efficiency and social welfare. Among the
most popular of the various concepts is that devised by Nicholas Kaldor and J.R. Hicks.
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency and the corresponding Hicks Compensation Principle acknowledge
that there will be 'winners' and 'losers' resulting from any government regulation. The
relevant question is whether the gain to the winners outweighs the losses to the losers such
that the winners could potentially compensate the losers and still be better off. If the
answer to that inquiry is yes, the regulation is deemed to be Kaldor-Hicks efficient. Most
economists would say that society is 'better off with that regulation in place because the
size of the nation's overall pie has been expanded, even though some people or groups are
left worse off.... Thus, in the regulatory context, striving for efficiency generally means
that the overall social welfare created by a federal safety regulation should be greater than
that existing before the government intervention." (footnotes omitted)).
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We all can assume that any new emergent technology carries
with it attendant costs. The technologies discussed at the beginning of
this article all brought tremendous benefits, but all had attendant
costs for their production and introduction into our society. The true
costs of an application of technology for an individual look something
like this:
Total Costs = Costs (To Individual)+ Costs (To Society including externalities)

So the Mb to be obtained has to equal a successful outcome minus the
total costs:
Mb = Successful Outcome - Total Costs
Mb = SO - Total Costs

Mb = SO - [Costs (To Individual) + Costs (To Society including externalities)]

As long as the marginal benefit to an individual is equal to or greater
than the benefit from a successful outcome minus the total costs, the
individual should acquire or utilize the new or emergent technology.
The same should hold true for a profit-maximizing dominant market
participant: as long as the marginal benefit from the use of the
technology is greater than or equal to the successful outcome of its use
minus the costs, the dominant market participant should use the
technology.
This overly simplistic equation should express a salient point
for consideration: what happens if the equation is incomplete? If the
costs to society are not transparent or the externality costs are not
included, then the required calculation cannot be made.
If the
calculation of the successful outcome should be a derivative of societal
norms (which have not been assessed) and the calculation of marginal
benefit should include an assessment of the donor or the costs of
commodification of the donor's eggs, then the equation is incomplete
and possibly invalid.
The collaborative arrangement between the dominant market
interests, the infertile consumer, and the government creates
information deficits. The asymmetries of information produce an
inefficient marketplace. The costs to society and to the individual are
not apparent in any calculation of maximum benefit to society or
marginal benefit to the consumer. Thus, any decisions based on the
available information are flawed due to a lack of completeness. At the
same time, society at large has a stake in avoiding commodification of
the human being. Yet this approach leaves very little room for a
discourse about the marketplace itself or the costs to society.
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The infertile consumer is a dominant stakeholder in this
market. Consequently, the buying and selling of gametes from women
raises serious ethical concerns about commodification. There are also
societal interests involved in (1) avoiding the exploitation of the
anxious or desperate infertile consumer, and (2) ascertaining the
ethical implications of the exploitation of life forms (e.g., the
embryonic or reproductive material).
II. CONCLUSION

The question of why egg selling exists may be answered by an
examination of the governmental and societal failures to address and
respond to ethical issues that arose when ART technology was new
and developing.
Advancing technology offered tremendous
possibilities for life-altering happiness and improved health at the
beginning of the twentieth century. In the mid-1980s, the government
and society failed to address ART and its ethical implications in the
private sector adequately. A political position against embryonic stem
cell research precipitated the withdrawal of federal governmental
funding and oversight from much of the research and application in
the fertility industry.
As a result, private fertility enterprise
continued its research largely unsupervised and aligned itself with
suppliers and technological producers. The convergence of the selfinterests of the suppliers and the dominant market forces currently
operates to create a situation of agency capture that has precluded
governmental regulatory scrutiny of the marketplace. Additionally,
states have also neglected to enter into the regulation of the
reproductive marketplace. Without societal scrutiny or regulatory
intervention, the marketplace remains open for business, but
consumers remain vulnerable due to information asymmetries that
only effective regulation can overcome.

